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A REVIEW, &c.
" We are in the midst of strong agitatiom, and a1·e surrounded by da.ngers to our institutions and gove,·nment. The imprisoned winds are let loose.
The East, the West, the N01·th, and the stormy &uth, all c1Jmbine to throw
the whole ocean into co'nimotion, 'to toas its billows to the skies, and disclose
its p1·0Jo1mdest aepths. I speak f 1;r the preservation of the Union. I speak
out of a solicitous and 'ltnxious heart, Joi· the restoration to the country of
that quiet and harmony 'wliich 'm ake tlie blessings of this Union so rich and
so dear to us all. If T can do li,nything, however little, for the p1·omotion of
this e,;d, I shall have accomplished all that I expect." - W EllSTER.

..

Tt mny be necessary, with those to whom the w-riter is not personally known,
He has
ma.mfested his ri~ht to make that claim by having, during the last five years,
'!ritten and published more, probably, than any other man, to arouse the nation to a perceP.tion of the proximate danger to the Union from tbe treasonable machinations of secessionists and abolitionists. For all that time he has
L~en oonstantly predicting th·e present state of national aJfairs. He has asFiduo'usly assaulted the secession heresy with argument and denunciation.
He has done what he could to portray the inestimable value of the Union, and
Ilic endless, numberless evils of its dissolution. Could there be such a thing
''' a dictatorship, he should deem its {'Ower right.ly employed in decimating
leading secessionists and abolitionists, m decimating the members of secession
conventions, and especially in decimating the secession members of the Virginia Cdnvention, the Tennessee and Missouri Legislatures, who ~o signally
betrayed popular trust.
He believes the present civil war will be long protracted; that we are mar ching with rapid strides to that military despotism predicted for us by the
fathers of the Republic; that the preservation of the Constitution, with those
principles of civil liberty which it consecrates and secures, is the very highest
obligation of patriotism, far above the mere preser vation of the Union; that
the entire destruction of the Constitution and civil liberty is a price the nation cannot afford to pay for preserving the Union; even if it were not absurd to S\)ppose that the preservation of the one requires the destruction of
the other; that it is a gross calumny on the structure of our government, to
charge that it is too weii.k to put down the present rebellion; and that if it
cannot be put down with an army of five hundred thousand men, and a large
navy, without trampling on the Constitution, it will be because of the incompetency of the President and his cabinet, and not from any fault in the structure of the government. With these views, the writer means perseveringly
to use his very humble efforts to stay the march to despotism, and· earnestly
entreats t-be co-operation of the thousands of far abler and younger meri
scattered tbrou~h the country. The opinions, as to principles now to be vindicated, were all matured and published near twenty years ago.
to p1:cm1se, that he claims to be a thorough and devoted Unionist.

Pr.esident Lincoln, in his message, avows that he has "author ized the
Commanding General, in proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend
the writ of habeas corpu<1; or, in other words, to arrest and detain, without
resort to the ordinary process and forms of law, such individuals as he might
deem dangerous to the public safety."
After a very brief discussion, of his power to do this, he excuses the not
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p:iving a more extended argument, bece.use one from the Attorney-General
will be presented to Congrea~. He thus adopts the fatter, and makes iL his own.
It is, no doubt, the r esult of full consultation between thei., aud also with
the Cabinet. 'l'he President is, to all intents, as fully responsible for the
arimroent as the Attorney-General himself. The matter will be eo treated.
The argument endeavors to prove the President's power so to suapend the
privile~e of the writ, so to order such arrests, and that in so doing he is not
controllable by the Judiciary; and perhaps, also, its true meaning is, that he
is not controllable by Congress either. In other words, it seems to be contended, thnt in the exercise of h.ia executive functions, for the suppreRsion of
rebellion, at least, if n ot for all other purposes, he nets by his own arbitrary
discretion, free from the control of Congress and the Judiciary-either, or
both. The pretension to this power is not con6ned, either by argument or
the President's acts, to each States or districts as may have been proclaimed
to be in insurrection; but the power operates all over the Union, and may be
applfod equally to a citizen of and in Maine, as to an inhabitant of a proclaimed State.
This is a high pretension, now for the first time asserted in behalf of a
President. Jn the existing state of things, and in view of what has already
been done, it is a pretension of the most momentous importance. lt places
the personal liberty of every man in this n ation within his arbitrary didcretion. He may arrest·any one, without justifiable cause, transport him ,vhere
he pleases, incarcerate him during the continuance of this war of probably
many years' duration, subjecting him daring the while to such deprivation,
hardship, awd humiliation, as the President mar think proper to inflict. For
all this the citizen is to have no redress. Against such atrocious, tyrannical
outrage the law of his country can afford him no redress.
Such startling innovation upon what has heretofore been considered the
well-settled principles of our government, such thorough destruction of the
most cherished right of freemen, the nation will naturally expect the President and Attorney to sustnin by some show of precedent, some judicial decision, or at leMt the opinion of some linvyer or statesmnn. But, reasonable
as such expectation is, it has not been complied with. Tbey adduce no authority-none whatever in their behalf-not a single _precedent., decision, or
opinion. The few cases they do cite, having not the slightest bearing in their
fa,vor, their citation only serves to prove, that., after careful search, no semblance of an authority can be found. (For a synopsis of th e cited oases, see
.Appendix D.)
A reference to the synopsis will show that they stand exposed, for impudentl;r
attempting the most dining usurpation of tyrannical power, and a most pernicious innovat;on on the structure of the government, without a precedent or
nn authority to sustain them. Their clnim retits exclusively upon their reasonin!(, whioh will be found ns little reliable as their pretended authorities.
These tremendous powers are vindicated by various propoaitions-6ome
ni,erely assumed, while others are attempted to be proved. They will bo considered in the following order :
1. The ex-officio powi:r to arre1t.
2. 'l.' he exemption from control.
. 3. The constitutional prohibitio111.
Tho argument, by way of introduction, gives the following fair vi-,w of the
fundamental structure of the Oovernment, which ls most cheerfully adopted
118 a atarting point for this review. Every lawyer will concur, and would use
similar languaito, in any argument for keeping the Pre.sident within constitutional limits. How it subserves nn argument, whose main purpose is to free
him from all restraint, is not ao obvious.
"In England it has grown into an axiom, that the Parliament is omnipotent. F or all the ende of government the Parliament is the nation. .But, in
this country, it has been carefully provided oUierwiee. * * * In breaking
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the ties with the British empire, complaints were leveled chiefly at the Ki11g,
not the Parliament, nor the people. In the formation of our na.tio'nal government, our fathers seem to have beei:. :!ctua.ted by special dread of the unity
of power, and, in framing the Constitution, they preferred taking the risk of
leaving some good undone for lack of power in the agent, rather than arm
any governmental officer with such powers for evil as are implied in the dictatol'ial charge, to "see that no damage comes to the Commonwealth."
" Hence they adopted the plan of checks and balances, forming separate
departments of government, giving each department separate and limited
powers.
"Our government, indeed, as a whole, is not vested with sovereignty, an<i
does not possess all the powers of the nation. I t has no power, but such
are grunted by the Constitution, and many powers are expressly withheld.
The nation is equal with all other nations, having equal powers, but it has not
chosen to delegate all its powers to this tovernment, in any or all Hs departments."
That is, it has not delegated all its legislative or .judicial power; and, having '' a special dread of the unity of po1ver," it hns been very careful not t'o
delegate all'its executive power to any single functionary.

1. Tm:l Ex-0FF1010 PowER oF ARR£ST,
Each department being confined to "granted -and limited " powers, according to th is full concession, the obvious first duty of Messrs. Lincoln and Bates
was to show a grant of the power of arrest to the President, and how it i11
limited. An unlimited grant would not fulfill the terms of the concession.
But this they do not do, nor pretend to do. 'fhey show neither a limited, or
unlimited grant of such power: neither can it be done. '1.'here is not a word
·
in the Constitution ·to that effect.
In England the power is a prerogative of the Crown. But we have no prerogative powers in this country. In Englnnd even, it is an exceptional power
of infrequent use, the power in practice being almost always confined to the
,Judi.ciary. Our ideas of government, being so essentially derived from th e
principles and practice of that of England, the framers of the Constitution
must have viewed th:e power of arrest as properly a judicial and not an executive function, and that consequently the whole power would go to the judiciary, in the absence of any express declaration to the contrary. Not being
properly an executive po,ver, they knew that it would not pass under any general grant of executive power; and if it had been desired or intended that
the President should participate in it,s exercise, they would have been very
careful to say so, and point out distinctly how far he should ptirticipate.
This not being done, there is not even the semblance of a fair pretext for his
participation to any extent whatever.
The uniform usage of our governments, both Federal and State, has been
in strict conformity with this view. We know that Mr. Lincoln is the first
.President who ever attempted the exercise of such a power. It is confidently
believed that no instance can be adduced of any such attempt by the GoTernor of any State, unless specially and ex1;1lieitly so authorized by la.w. •It
is also believed that there has not been an mstance of such attempt, with or
without law, for it is so contrary to all our American ideM of proper government, that it is not credible any State convention or legislature shoula have
been foolish enough to confer such power on a Governor.
Thi~ is a hi.~h pretension, now for the first time asserted in behalf of the
President. The attempted innovation should be well fortified with precedent
or anitlogy. Neither is adduced. We are not even furnished with an attern pted argument in its behalf. It rests entirely upon bold, impudent assumption.
It is true, tbat, after General-Wilkinson, under circumstances of supposed
State neces1ity of great urgency, had made ar bitrary arrests of suspected
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&ccomplices of Burr, President Jefferson approved hid act, not by reason of its
legality, but in despite its admitted illegality. The Supreme Court condemned
the arrests as illegal, notwithstanding the presidential ratification, and Conii:r ess persistently refused to indemnify Wilkinson for tl1e damages to which
he wa,; made liable, at tho suit of the persons arrested.
The bill, whic~, about that time, at the instance of ,Jefferson, paseed the
Senate, for suspending tho writ of habeas corpus, and which was indignantly
rojeoted by the Honse of Representatives, contained express grant of power
to the President to mii,ki: arrests. This bill was, no doubt, dra.fled under advisement with Jefferson and his cal.tinet, and is foll proof that neither they
nor the Senate thought the President, e;c-officio, possessed any such power, or
that he would possess it 11fter the suspensi~n of the writ, without an express
congressional grant.
lt is true, also, that Genei:.al Jackson made sundry arl>itrary arrests at
New Orleans, under his pretended martial luw. But he l\ad been told iu advance by two most distingu_ished lawyers-Edward Livingston and .Abrn>.r L.
Duncan-who were bi, friends, and ncted as his aids, that he bad no power
to declare martial Jaw. .An intelligent court martial,
his own selection,
decided his martial law to be a ml)re nullity, and iave him no power over citizens not attached to the army or militia. The District Court (U. S.) afterwards decided in the Sl\]lle way-as did also a very able Appellate Court, of
Louisiana, after full investigation and enlightened discussion.
It is true, Congress, some twenty years afterwards, refunded the line imposed upon him by the District Court, but, in so doing, special care was taken
not to use one word, either in the preitmblo or body of the act, in justification
of his martial law, or in censure of the judge who imposed the fine. On the
contrary, a committee of the Senate, of which Mr. Berril\n was chairman,
and another of the House, of which the present Senator Pearce, from Jlaryland, W!\S chairman, each made a report denouncing martia.l law as wholly
inadmissible in "this free Republic."
It is not contended thal a military commander may not make pri6oners of
rebels found resisting, with arms in their bands, and all other s proximately
present, aiding and assistin~ without ar ms, or found in illegal gathering, to
a id rebellion. Warfare agarnst rebellion may, no doubt, be carried on according to the civilized usaies of war among hostile nations, and among the
incidents thereto, is the making and det&ining of prisoners to be handed over
to the civil authorities for trial a nd punishment. But the arrest of citizens
not engaged in hostilities is a different thing, and must be left to the civil a~r
thorities by due process of law. 'l'be one is a thing of absolute, unavoidable
necessity, fulfilling the very purpose for which the military is called in aid of
the civil authority, and is in accordance with usage and precedent, whereas
the other ie not a matter of absolute necessity, is contra"ry to usage and precedent, and should be left to the adequate judicial corps appointed by Jaw for
that purpose. If this corps is not sufficiently numerous to answer the need
of such an occasion as the present, the proper remedy is by a temporary increase of its members.
The true theory of the whole matter-the constitutional theory- is, that a
President, in putting down a rebellion, performs little, if anything, more than
the functions of a sheriff at tho head of a posse commitatus. The army and
navy, when so employed, are, in legal sense, only a larger and more powerful
sort of posse. 'l'his was the view taken by the Government of Massachusetts
during Shiiy's rebellion, and by Washington during the Pennsylvan ia insurrection. W!\Shington told his army" they should not consider themselves as
judges or e;cecutioners of the law!, but as employed to support the proper authorties in the execution of them." In other words, that he and his army
were merely acting in aid of the proper officers of the law. Lord Hardwick
said: "The military act on occasions of resistance to law-not qua military,
but simply in aid of and in obedience t.o the civil power, which calls them in."
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ExE!lPTION b'ROM CoNTROL.

Let the power of arrest be conceded to the President, still the power-in hishands, as m that of any other officer, must, according to theory and uniform
prnctice, be sub~ect to the ~upervision and control of the judiciary. It is so
in England. Neither the Crown, nor either House of Parliament, enjoys
any exemption. The world has never known a prouder political body, nor
one more jealously vigilant in the preservation of its power and prerogative
than the House of Commons; yet, it has been compelled, like the Crown
and the Rouse of Lords, willingly or unwillingly, to submit to the supervision
and control of its arrests and imprisonments. The same is true in this
country, aa to both Rouses of Congress, as has been exemplified in various
instances. Indeed, if both Houses, with the approval of the President, should
so far forget themselves as to unanimously order the arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of the humblest citizen, no lawyer doubts the competency of the
Judiciary to inquire into the legality of the imprisonment, and discharge the
prisoner.
From the be~inning; our Federal and St~te Judiciary have exercised the
power of deciding upon the constitutionality of the acts of all officials. This .
has been done not merely with the uniform acquiescence of all the depar tments of both sets of government, but with the cordial, unanimous approval
of the whole nation. It has become the ingrained opinion, the heart-cherished
belief of every .American, as it is of every enlightened Englishman, that the
judiciary are the conservators of his dearest personal rights as a freeman.
His belief especially is, that so long as we have an honest, independent judiciary, he 'W'ill be exempt from the despotic, tyra_nnical power of arbitrary
arrest and imprisonment- at least, until the legislature, in its wisdom,.
shall temporarily suspend the writ of habeas corpus. His belief is, that
whenever the legislature does that, and confers upon the executive the power
of civil arrest, it will accompany the grant with such safeguards and limitations as not unnecesearily to trench upon the liberty of worthy citizens, and
not leave them farther than cannot be avoided, to the arbitrary caprice and
malice of the President and his subordinates.
But now wc are told that we have to unlear n all this; that we have one
functionary in this free Republic, who is above control, who is not to be controlled by a law which controls Kiogs, Lords, and Commons in England,
Congresses and Legislatures in .America; that our President Lincoln is far
above su<;h control; that it would be derogatory to his executive independence to submit to such control. "Upon what meat does this our magnificent
Cresar feed, that he is grown so great, so got the start of the majestic world?"
(.Af pend ix B.)
f the President, when actin~ in conjunction with Congress, is under judicial control as to the constitut1onality of his acts, surely every principle of
analogy and policy require, he should also be under such control when acting
separately upon his mere discretion and authority_ If not, then there is
something in the Constitution which gicves him that. exemption. Where is
that clause, phrase, or word? :Messrs. Lincoln and Bates say, it is to be
found in the clause- " The Executive power shall be vested in a President."
It does not say frco from control, any mor.e than.it. says the legislative power.
vested in Congress shall be uncontrolled. If the c.onvention had contemplat.ed
vesting uncontrollable power, in either of the-two departments, it would have·
rather been in that highest of all the departments, which was to wield the
great legislative power, as the representatives of the people and the States,
composed, too, of such numbers as to propitiate popular confidence, ratherthan that other department to be filled by a single individual, and of whose
powers, according to the admission of Messrs. Lincoln and Bates, the framersof the Constitution had such a "special dread."
" The executive power shall be vested," &c. What power? Not all the,
executive power of the nation- this they themselves admit wa.s not intended.
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It meant such as

Wl\8 granted in the Constitution, or wbioh might be created
by law. ·Because, it was impracticable to specify or enumcmte all executive
powers, because moat of them would depend upon tho creation, regulation,
and consequent control of Congress-their spemfication or enumeration was
not attempted-and not because of any special trust or confidence in tho officer.
Whore is tho law granting this power of Arbitrary arrest? Thero is none
such; there can be none such, for it would be a plain violation of the Constitution. Unleas, indeed, they Mn make good their bold, novel position, that
tho power is a necessary indispensable incident to executive power, of which
the President cannot be deprived, and in whose exercise he cannot be oontrolled by Congress or the Judiciary.
It is very doubtful whether the President hns any incidental or inferential
power, properly so called. Or, in other ,vords, whether all his powers must
not come by express grant. So it was held by Calhoun, and other Senators, in
tho great debate on Jackson's Protest. (Seo AJ?pendix A.) Indeed this seems
fulJy admitted by Messrs. Lincoln and Bates rn that part of their argument
where they say: "Our gonroment as a whole, even, is not vested with sovereignty, and does not possess nil the powers of the nation. It has no powers
but such as are granted by the Constitution. 'l'he nation baa not chosen to'
delegate all its powers to this government, in nny or nil its branches." When,
therefore, a power is claimed for either department, a specific grant must be
shown. 'l'bo implied or constructive powers nre amply and well provided for
by the final clause of tho section granting powers to Congress: "To make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper ror carrying into executioll tho foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or any dipartment or officer thereof." Thero is
no such clause as to tho Judiciary or Executive; neither of them is vested
with all such other power as may be necessary or proper for carrying into
uec1ttion the powers granted to them. As to nil auxiliary powers, they must
wait for, and are wholly dependent upon, the action of Congress. There is
scarce a conceivable thing, beyond a call of Congress and tho reception of
Ambassadors, that tho President can do without the previous sanction of Con~ess. The clauses, saying-" The Executive power shall be vested in a President, and the Judicial power in one Sup1·emo Court," &c., mean that beyond
the express grants contained in the Constitution, whenever Congress requires
an executive or judicial function to be performed, the po,l'er therefor shall be
conferred by Congress on those departments respectively. Such has been the
uniform construction and practice. Messrs. Lincoln and Bates claim th1\t the
President can, at bis mere discretion, arrest any man or woman in the nation,
and transport him or her to a romote quarter to be kept in secret incarceration during the rebellion, though it should last many long years. This, too,
ho has actually done by many secret arrest.II in unproelaimed Stotes. In
plaoe of the open, direct, manly, day-light proceeding of England and America, he is instituting tho lettres de cacliet and Bastiles of France, with tho secret, midnight searches and seizures of the Spanish Inquisition. 'l'his power
they claim for him, because, they sa.y, he is the sole, uncontrollable judge
of the manner in which he shall exercise his power in putting do,vo rebellion. That ie, because be has tho army, the navy, and the militia under
his control, he may use the power they afford to make the arrestl! and imprisonment, that being, in his opinion, a proper aid towards suppressing the rebellion. If the unarmed pri vato citizens he ohooses to suspect, ana arrest
become too numerous and expensive to keep, without too great a burthcn upon
the treasury, why may he not cut their throats? Why may he not take one
,man's property and give it to another? Why not raise money through forced
Joans? Why not destroy or confiscate tho property of tho suspected? 'l'hese,
,in his opinion, would all be most efficient aids in suppressing the robollion.
Tho army and tho navy furnish him ample power to use such aids. Ay, but,
they will say, he is too good a man so to abuse his discretion. But does not
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the enormities which may be committed under the power they claim, prove
that he can have no such power.
It never could have been the intention to entrust such discretion to any
man. It is contmry to all analogy to derive such power by implication. His
plan ma7 he a very efficient one; the Constitution and Congress may be very
unwise 1n not authorizing him to pursue that plan, but its excellence affords
no reason for his usurpin<r the right t-0 pursue it. From the fact of having
the physical power under his command, to enforce the -plan, he cannot infer a
r ight so to use that power. He had as well contend, that because God has •
given him the physical power to murder, therefore he is at liberty to commit
murder.
The argument is; that it is the "plain, peculiar duty of the President to
put down rebellion." They speak of it as an ex-officis duty in the perform·
ance of which he has a right to. employ, at his discretion, any power under
his control. The army and navy were always under hie control. Then why
was it necessary, by the act of 1807, specially to authorize him to use them
in putting down rebellion? 'fhe truth is, he could not even aid in putting
down rebellion, by rea,son merely of any ex-o_fficio power. Hence the acts of
Congress expressly giving him the power. So far from its being his "plain,
peculiar duty to put down rebelJion," the duty is peculiar, if to any one, to
Congress, with whom the power rests, and from whom the President's duty
and power in the matter altogether proceeds.
The argument says: "'l'he insurrection is purely political. Its object is
to destro I the political government of this nation, and to establish another po·
litical government uron its ruins. The President is eminently and exclusively political in al his principal functions. As the political chief of the
nation, the Constitution charges him with its preser·vation, p1·otection, and
defence. In that character he arrests and holds in custody those wbom, in
the exercise of his political· discretion, he believes to be friends of, and accomplices in, the armed insurrection. Ho has no judicial powers. The judicial department has no political powers, and therofor.e no court or judge can
take cognizance of the political act-s of the President, or undertake to revise
or reverse his political decision."
In another part of the argument it is said: "All the other officers are re•
quired to swear only "to support this constitution," while the President must
swear "to preserve·, protect, and defend it," which implies tlie power to pe1·.
form what he is required in so solemn a manner to undertake. Then follows
the broad, compendious injunction, to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed." '!'his injuncti0n, embracing as it does, all the laws, Constitution,
treaties, statutes, is addressed to the President alone, and not to any other department or officer. 'l'his constitutes him in a poouliar manner, and above all
other officers, tlie guardian of the Constitution-its preserver, protector, and
defender."
This is not the first time that a great to-do haR been made by a President,
over the difference between the form of his official oath, and that of other officers, though there is in fact no substantial difference between them, the oath
to :support the Constitution being every way equivalent to one to preserve,
protect, and defend it; for it cannot be properly supported unless 1t is preserved, protected, and defended. The difference was not intended to indicate,
nor was it ma.de because of any special trust in the President as a safe
guardian, but from an opposite reason. It was because of that "special
dread" which was felt, as admitted, of Presidential power, that an apparently
somewhat more stringent oi.th was prescribed for him than for the other officers. It was merely intended to make his promise 10ore emphatic. The na·
tion must have partaken very little of the views of the Convention, if the latter
really looked to him as the peculiar guardian of the Constitution, for nothing
can be better known, than that from the very commencement the nation
looke~ upon the Judiciary as its peculiar guardian, and bas so regarded them
ever srnce.
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Tho first attempt to use tho oath in this way was mnde by Jackson, in bis
famous Protest, to screen himself from censure for his abuse of r.ower in the
removal of the deposits. The language used gave some plausibility to the
idea, that he was attempting to derive power from the words of the oath, and
it wns so charged, until his leading friends in the Senate disclaimed for him
any @uch intention. Before the:disclaimer came, Clay spoke of the imput-ed
attempt as follows:
"'l'he President begins and ends the protest with a r esort to his official oath
• as a source of power, which no man before ever regarded as gt'&Dting power .
What is the oath? He is 'u, pruerve, protect, and defend the Constitution.'
Taken in their largest, most extensive sense, and r egarding the oath as a
grnnt of power , these exJJressions may be interpreted to create a right and
duty, on the part of the President, to preserve and protect the Constitution,
as be understands it, against all violations by whomsoever attempted. lf the
Supreme Court, State L egislatures, or Governors, or even Congress, should
expound the Constitution contrary to his sense of its meaning, be may employ nil the means at his command, military and civil, to prevent the threat·
ened violation. 'l'he consequence would be, that we should have but one ex•
pounder of the Constitution in the whole Go,,ernment, and but one will COD·
trolling nil its operations. Never before did any man regard the official oath
as eontaining a grant of power."
N'ow we have two men, Messrs. Lincoln and Bates, who do not cause it to
be merely su~peoted, that they are claiming power by virtue or the oath, but
boldly, unblushingly, undisguisedly clahu the oath as a grant of enormous,
o' crmastering power. 'l'hey s&y, "the President must swear to preserve, pro-uct, and defend the <Jouatitutum, which, implies the power to perform what
be is required in so solemn a manner to undertake." Thus, what tho intelligent friends of .Jackson in the :::icnate w.ere compelled to shrink from aod disavow as an indefensible folly, those gentlemen have the effrontery distinctly
to claim ns the grant of power so limitless fo e:ttent as to afford ample
foundation for that military dictatorship which, it is suspected, they and
others desire to estnblfsh over the nation. Dictatorship over Congress,
and all tho office-seeking part of the nation, his five hundred million patronage has alroody given l1im; we have yet to see whether bis army of ~ve
hundred thousand men will give it to him over the balance or tho nation.
The issue is, at least, doubtful. \Vbilst it r emains so all true men should
struggle while they may, to retard, to prevent the rapid march to an unmitigated tyranny.
Messrs. Lincoln and Bates arc men of for too much intelligence not to
know that to claim t.he oath ns a grant of power is the merest absurdity.
Wb on such men resort to such means to gull the million, as to usurpations,
they render themselves obnoxious to the strongest suspicion. No past repu•
tation for integrity gives any exemption to such suspicion. The possession
of great power is new to Mr. Lincoln. I ts intoxicatmg influence is prov1;r·
binl. ~e has given no evidence of any desire to resist that influence! but 1n
evorythmg betrays that easy virtue which promptly yields without res1sta1_1co.
His past rcputnt1on for intc~rity, so for from shielding him from suspicion,
becomes itself suspected. The well-earned reputation for political integrity
of a Washington and a Madison nil combined in a single -President, woul_d
not, undei: such circumetllnce11, shelter him from suspicion. What ha~ this
new, untried man, the President of a minority, the mere bead of a sectional
party, largely fanatical, to shield him? The nation must look c~r~fully,
h eedfully to this matter. With a President wielding five hundred m1lhon of
patronage, controlling five hundred U1ousand armed men, and claiming and
using such enormous, unrestrained power, every patriot should be on the
alert.
'l'hey further tell us: "The 1nsurrection is purely political." What stuO: is
this? I s not every rebellion equally p<>litical? It mAy. do so to oharacte_rize
it in common parlance to distinguish it from a religious rebellion or a wh18ky
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rebellion. But, in a legal sense, there is no such disiinction, they, equally
with this, being a revolt against the political powel' of the government, and
equally requirin)l; that power to put them down.
"'l'his insurrection is purely political. Its object is to destroy the political
government of the nation." Is not the object and effect equally to destroy
the judicial and every other non•political part of the government?
"The President, as the political chief of the nation, arrests and holds in
custody those wh<>, in the exercise of his political di.,cretion, he believes to be
friends of and accomplices in the armed insurrection." Not t hose against
whom the1·e is proof to cause belief, but those w,hom the President chooses to
believe, without proof, are accomplices. Are we to imitate the base acts of
the French revolution, when men were imprisoned, if not beheaded, because
they were suspected of being suspicious.
"'l'he judicial department has no political powers, and therefore no court
or judge can take cognizance of the political acts of the President." This,
too, though they say "he is exclusively political in all his princip11,l functions."
That is, in the discharge of all bis ramified duties and manifold powers, the
legality of his acts are subject to no judicial test or investip:ation. His sic
volo, sic jubeo are to stand in lieu of Jaw. If this does not startle up the nation, wide awa,ke, what will? His dispersing the members of the two Houses
of Congress by the bayonets of his armed myrmidons ought' not to have any
greater effect-indeed, not so much. By the power of patronage he holds the
majority of Congress, already, in submissive obedience. 'l'hey are an aid,
rather than a hindrance, to any usurpation be may choose .to make. 'l'he liberties, tho property, not to say the Jives of every man and woman of this ~reat nation rest on his discretion; they can be taken away at his arbitrary will; they
are only enjoyed by his permission. V\Tith a submissive Congress, and an impotcn t judiciary,, what are any man's rights worth? what guarantee has he for
them? 'this is no attempt at fictitious alarm, at an improbable, non-presumable
state of things. I t already exists. Men have been ta.ken from their beds at
the dead hour of night, sec1·,e tly incarcerated in remote States, and their
friends cannot learn even t!.e alleged cause of arrest. These arrests, too,
made in States against which there is no proclsmation of rebellion, and none
properly can be iaade. \'vhe11 commanded by the nation to produce a prisoner before the Chief Justice ar,d show the cause of his detention, he denies
the power of the. nation, or which is the same, the power of the Jaw to send
such a comIQand.. He authorises his military subordinates to proclaim and
enforce mai:tial law over the people of States not proclaimed to be iQ rebellion. 'l'hat iti, he authorizes those subordinates to substitute their will in
place of hw, and to go\'ern those people by their arbitrary will. He directa
or permits those subordin:ites to not merely violate the freedom of the press,
but actually to suppress entirely the publication of newspapers. 'fhese are
some only of the initiatory steps- what is to follow no man can tell.
In arresting and imprisoning he exercises political power, it is said, and
therefore no couJ't or judE(e can take cognizance of his acts. The House of
Rcpresentatil'es bas none but political powers, yet when it imprisons a citizen
it has to submit too. judicial order for his enfranchisement. If anything can
properly be called purely political power, it is the legislative power of Con•
gress. Yet if, by unanimous vote, with the President's approval, Congress
passes an act to arbitrnrily imprison or otherwise punish o. citizen, the Judi•
ciary can take cognizance, is bound to take cognizance, and release the pris•
oner in despite all the dignity and power of Congress. 'l'his not only every
lawyer, but every tolerably informed citizen well knows. Thert1 is, therefore,
no myth or virtue in a political power, merely because it is political, to deprive a citizen of his constitutional right to be protected against its unlawful
exercise to, bis injury.
'fbere are a certain class of ·execntive powers, such as appointing to office,
·which are purely discretionary, which judges and books of high authority,
for the sake of classification, denominate, rather inaccurately, political
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powers. For though all such power may be political, yet all political power
is not purely discretionary. The distinction therefore is properly between
po,vers purely discretionary, as the appointing, the veto, and the treatymaking power, and those which are not. The former are not, whilst the latter are, subject to judicial control without reference to the fact whether the
power be political or otherwise. There is another rule, which, though it miiy
not cover the whole ground, is sound and safe as far as it goes. That is,
all ministerial, executive acts, so far M they trench upon individual right, are
subject to judicial control.
According to the theory of our government, every right must have a remedy
for its enforcement, and every wrong a redress.
As said by the Supreme Court in M,1rbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch, 162:
" The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever be receives an injury.
One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. Jo Great
Britain, the King hi1nself is sued in the respectful form of petition, and he
never fails to perform the judgment of the Court."
"The Government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
Government of law, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserrn this
hij!h appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a legal
right."
"Is it to be conteuded that heads of departments are not answerable to the
laws of their country?" * * "What is there in the exalted station of the
officer which shall bar a citizen from asserting in a court of justice his legal
rights, or shall forbid a court to listen to his claim? If one of the heads of
department commits an illegal act, under color of his office, by which an individual sustains injury, it cannot be pretended that his office alone e:s:empts
him from being sued or compelled to obey the judgmcpt of the law."
Hence the inference, that while the President is merely passive, only failing to exercise an executive power whose exercise rests m his discretion, or
exercises it without injury to prirntc right, the court can take no cognizance;
but when the power is brought into action, and an individual thereby illegally sustains injury, the courts mny give him redre~s, though the President
himself commanded the act to be done. Thus the acts of the President and
his subordinates, in the m_anagement of soldiers, thouj!h a power accompanied
with much discretion as to the mode of exercise, yet being ministerial, if unlawfully used to the injury of i. citizen, the courts can give him redress. So
where t.he President, in the exercise of his discretion, as to the mode of m,inaging the military force in putting down a rebellion, chooses to use part of it
in the illegal arrest and imprisonment of a citizen, the courts must give relief. This, too, though (as surmised by Messrs. Lincoln and Bates) the President should sink the dignity of his office so low, as himself personally to become tho catch-pole aod jailor.
.A.s said by Blackstorie, "the law is no respect.or of persons; but in England,
for fundamental reasons of State policy, this is taken in subjection to the
maxim that the king can do no wrong and no mandate can be directed personally to him. We have a.:, such maiim or legal reason why a judicial mandate should not go against him as well as any other officer. But from reasons
of comity to a co-ordinate department, and of respect for the exalted station,
the courts will refrain from sending such mandate as long and M for as duty
will perrnil. '!'hat bis station gives him le~al exemption from judicial coercion
is an idle pretense. No one knows better than Messrs. L incoln and Bates,
that he can he sued for debt and made to pay it; that be can be sued fo1· an
art-icle of personnl property and made to deliver it up from his very clutch in
his own palace; that if the law of the District of Columbia allows irnprisonment for debt, be may, under a judgment of the Federal Court there, be incarcer ated for its non-payment, with no legal power in the land to release him
without payment; and farther, that in a State Court he can be tried for any
crime, and even hung for murder. How perfectly preposterous, then, the
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preteneion, that the le~ality of an arrest or imprisonment by one of his 11ubordinates, shall not be Judicially inquired into because done by his order.
This is a most magnificent President we have. He not only denies to the
Judiciary all control over his official acts, but denies it to Congress also. This,
too, though nearly all the executive power he has-muoh the major part at
least-he derives throuµ:h Congress, who could repeal it away from him tomorrow. Nor is this all. He claims that he is responsible for his official
conduct to the Court of Impeachment alone; yet, when called upon by the
grand inquest, the House of Representatives, which has the sole power of impeachment, to say why he arrested and imprisons certain citizens, he refuses
to answer. He refuses to answer at the nation's command, given through its
writ of liabeas corpus, and refuses to answer at the request of tho nation's
r epresentatives, or at least those who call themselves such. Verily, if the nat ion on!; had real representatives, ho would soon be shorn of his lofty pretensions, his vaulting_ ambition controlled, and he made to know that no ma1i in
tliis country is a-bove tlie law. (See Webster's strictures on the one-man
power, Appendix C; and also what Kent and other judges, of the Supreme
Court of New York, said as to a military commander's exemption from obedience to the writ of habeas corpus, Appendix, D.)
Blackstone, l Com., 135, cites the statute 16, Car. 1, which says: If any
person be restrained of his liberty by order of any illegal court, or by command of tlie King's majesty in person, or by warrant of the council board,
or of any of the privy council, he shall have a writ of habeas corpus lo bring
bis body before th e Court, who shall determine whether the cause of his
commitment be just, and do as to justice shall appertain. Upon this he comments as follows:
"Of great importance to the public is the preservation of personal libert.y;
for if once it were left in the power of any, tbe highest magistrate to imprison, arbitrarily, whomever he or his officers thou~,t proper, there would
soon be an end of all other rights and immunities. l:lome have thought that
unjust attacks even upon life, or property, at the arbitrary will of the magistrate, are less dangerous to the commonwealth than such as are upon the per·
sonal liberty of the subject. 'l'o bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation or tr ial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism as must at once eonvey the alarm of tyranny thro~bout the whole kingdom: but, confinement of the person by secretly hurry mg
him to jail, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, or
Jess striking, and therefore more dangerous engine of arbitrary government.
Yet sometimes, when the State is in real danger, even this may be a nece!•
sary measure. But the happiness of our Constitution is, that it is not left to
the executive po,l'er to determine when the danger of the State is so grent as
to render this measure expedient: for it is the parliament only, or legislative
power, that can authorize the Crown, by suspending the liabeas corpus net for
a short or limited time, to imprison suspected persons without giving any
reason for so d<,iag."
As before remarked, the suspension in this country gives no such power to tho
executive; because, unlike the King, it has, ex--0.fficio, no such power of arrest;
but, if Conb'l"CSS wishes to do so, it must confer the power on the P resident, as
was attempted by th e bill which pa.Med the Sennte, and was r ejected by the
House in 1807. On that occasion, Mr. Dana, a distinguished membe-r of the
House, from Connecticut, 'a jurist and a statesman, said: 11 'fbis bill author1 izes the arrest of citizens not merely by the President, but by any person ading under him. I imagine this to be wholly without precedent. If treaso11
were mai·cliing to force us from our seat., I would not agree thus to destroy
the fundamental principles of tlie Constituti-On, and commit such an act of
despotism and pusillanimity." Chief Justice Taney haa gone a step further
than this, and decided, or at least intimated, in the Merriman case, that Congresa can confer no power of arr est upon the President. If b7. udue process
of law" tho Constitution me(lnB that every prosecution, i n all its stages, even

'
14
the incipient one of arrest, must be conducted under judicial authority, then
the intimation is clearly right, for nothing is plainer, or better settled, than
that Congress can confer no judicial power upon tho executive. 'l'Lat such ill
the true meaning of "due process of law," is inferable from the clause say,
ing, "no warrant shall issue but upon probable·cau,e, supported by ontb, and
particularly describing the person to be seized. Now, \l'bat is probabh, cause?
and what affidavit will au,pport the allegation of -probable cause? and what is
particular description of the person? are ull questioM to be decided, and
would seem by all analdgy and precedent to require a judicial decision. Besides, the uniform practice is to that'itfect. J f, then, Congress canno't expressly
grant the power, the Prlll!ident cannot possibly ha,·e it by any process of construction or intendment; for all his power, being derived through the acts of
Congress, it would be proposterous to contend, that, in authorizing him to use
tho army in putting down rebellion, 1t power can be implied to use the army in
a manner which Congrc~s could not expressly ·authorize. On tho contrary, he
takes th11 trust -on the implied understanding tbat bis discretion, ns to the
mode of using tho power, shall not extend beyond what Congress could authorize, that being manifestly beyond it.I! probable intention, which intention ia
his imperative guide and law.
3. Tu.& CoNSTITOTION.AL PRoHllllTIONS.

First among these comes that which says: "The pririlege of the writ of
habeas corpu•
not be suspended unless when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it."
1t would be nn a.ct no loss of presumption than supererogation, for any
man to attempt to aid what Chief Justice Taney hne said in tho Mcrrimall
case, to prove that the whole power of suspension is with Congress, exclusively
with Congress. His opinion will be cherished not merely WI an endurin,
monument of official fidelity, but as a proud evidence of octogenarian ability.
It will be cherished b,Y tho profession a.s & high, finished specimen of luminous, convincing judicial disquisition. McsRrs. Lincoln and Bates have manifested only proper prudence, by shrinking from nil nttempt to answer 'What ia
so unanswerable. They cont-ent themselves with a fceb~ effort to dodge
round it.
'fhey admit that the power to prohibit the issuing of the writ cnn only be
exercised by Congress, because it is a 9.uasi repeal of a statute, which is iegislation. With 'this &dmiesion it is difficult to understand even what they
mean by tho metaphysical sophistry with which they attempt a distinction
between the power to issuo the writ nod the privilege of enjoyin~ its protection. The prohibition was not ma•le for the sake of the j udiciary, bat for
that of tho citizen. It is nothing to the judiciary to have the power, but it is
nil important to the citizen that the power should be kept in operation for hie
benefit. Jt is immaterial to him how ho is deprived of the protection, whether
by the legislature or the executive. 'l'ho injury to him is the same. It is incredible, therefore, t-0 common men and more common sense, that the legislature should be so carefully prohibited from taking away bis protection,
,vhilst the executire was left free to disregard his right. This the more especially when it is remembered, that it is against executive officers that the writ
is most generally, indeed almost exclusively, used; for it is they who most frequently make illegal, arbitrary arrests; and theref6ro it is they, in particular,
more than all others, against whom he needs protection. They are bold, not
to say desperate, who att-empt to convict tho Constitution of such an absurdity-not merely a self-contra.diction, bnt & sort of suicidal self-nnllification.
lt will be in vain to attempt to convince tho nation, that the makers of that
constitution were such mnl-ex1;>erts, that, whilst carefully prohibiting Congres,
from taking a.way from tho citizen his judicial protection aiz;ainst executive
oppression, the executive itself should be left free to oppress him at pleasure.
Congress and the Executive combined can infringe the protecuon under cer-
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tAin prescribed condition&, yet the Executive alone is left to do it upon hie
own untrammeled discretion. If he was left free 'to oppress, why trammel
Conuress with restriction? Thia is mere lust of power run stark mad; so
blinaed by its eagerness for usurpation that it cannot see the most palpable
absurdity.
If according to the concession the writ must issue, why shall it not be
obeyed? It carr ies the imperative command of tho law. Who shall dare disobey? Who, in this country, is above the law? Who enjoys that dispensing prerogative of suspending or silencing the law, for the attempt to exercise
which an English King lost his head?
If either department, as between the Judiciary and the Executive, could
properly be allowed, by mere intendmont, a discretion as to the suspension of
the privilege of the writ, it would seem to be rather that department which
has its custody and control, than that which is not so trusted, has no control
over its issue, and against whom, in ninety cases out of every hundred, it or•
dinarily does issue. Yet, it is a;;reed on all hands, that the Judiciary has no
such suspending power. Until the advent of Messrs. Lincoln and Bates the
opinion was equally unanimous, that the Executive has no such power. 'l'hey
have not adduced, nor can they adduce any respectable legal opinion to the
contrary.
But yield the President tbe power of arrest, with tbe discretion to suspend
the privilege of the writ, still unless he make the arrest in person, he must
issue some sort of warrant or order, verbal or written; and the Constitution
says none such "shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oatb, aud
particularly describing the person to be seized." That old-time engine of
tyranny general warrants will not do. There must be a special warraot for
each case. lt ·m atters not who has the power of arrest, the Constitution is
imperative, that no warrant--that is, no order-shall issue except in the man•
ner prescribed.
·
lf, as claimed, the President's discretion over the privilege of the writ, and
his power of arbitrary arrest come by reason of the great confidence reposed
in him by tbe Constitution, then this trusted power is personal, and peculiar to
himself. He can no more transfer or deputize this high discretion, than Congress can deputize its legislative, or a court its judicial power. 'l'he exerci8'6
of the discretion and power is unavoidably thus restricted to the President;
and when so restricted-he will confess that it is not worth contending for, as
it can render little or no aid in putting down rebellion.
"No person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law." It
has been decided in numberle..~s instances, by Federal and State Courts, that
"process of law" means judicial process. It has also been uniformly so held
by all statesmen. Now, the President, ha.ving no judicial power, nor power
to issue or command the issue of any judicial ptocess, how can he a rbitrarily
deprive a citizen of liberty-that is, imprison him-by his own order, or any
mere executi11e process whatever? The pretension is absurd. 'l'he Constitu•
tion makes no exception of time or occasion when this rule need not be observed; it is laid down for uniform, constant observnuce n.t all times, and under all circum11tances. This greatly strengthens the argument against tho
right of Congress directly to confer the power to arrest upon the President.
It is absolutely conclusive against giving him the power to imprison. Fot
whatever plausibility there may be in the idea, that mere temporary arrest, for
the purpose of being carried before the proper functionary, is not depriving a
man of his liberty, within the meaning of the Constitution; yet, to imprison
him, is certainly to so deprive him. If one of the objects of the imprisonment
be to prevent his access to such functionary or to his constitutional guardian,
the Court, it becomes a. deprivation of liberty of the most ff a.grant, indubitably
unconstitutional character. But Mr. Lincoln does not pretend that his arbitra.ry arrests and imprisonments have been or will be made witli the exclusive view of bringing the arrested to trial, but boldly, frankly avows that it is
done for the ptrrpose of rendering th-e suspected "powerless for mischief un til
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the exigency is pMt;" that is, until this probably long war is over. The
Constitution tells Mr. Lincoln plainly, emphatically, that he shall have no
power thus to tyrannize over his fellow-citizens, that he abnll not eo imprison
them; but he says he will.
•
'l'his rule as to imprisonment, being so imperative, and without exception,
it would seem to apply even during a temporary suspension of the writ of
habecu corpu.,, 80 that there could not be even then a legal imprisonment,
without some sort of judicial order. Howsver much this construction may
seem to some persons needlessly to ho.mper the efficiency of the Government
in putting down rebellion, there need be no surprise at ii.II being eo arranged,
for some of our wisest statesmen were earnestly opposed t-0 allowing anybody, even Congress, to suspend the writ. Many eminent writers in England
and Europe nave expressed tile opinion that its suspension should ne,·er be
allowed in a Republic. 'l'he o.rgument ab inconvenienti might rightfully induce Congress, during a suspension, to consider a more arrest as a qu<UJi ministerial act, such as the Eucutive might constitutionally be empowered to
perform; but whenever it comes to formal imprisonment, for the more pur•
pose of rendering a freeman "powerless for mischief," then the judicial functions must be brought into requisitfon. This may cause some inconvenience,
some diminution of efficiency, as it cortainly will require a large increase of
deputy mauhals and subordinate judicial officers; but better, far better that
inconvenjence and expense, than truijt arbitrary, tyrannical power in the
hands of any man. So our fathers thought; so let us continue to think and
act; so let us make tho President know and act.
The argument says that Congress has the power, not the-right, at any time
to repeal the act ~iving the Courts power to issue the writ, but attempts no
use of the fact in 11lustration of the President's a,seumed power, and therefore
the matter needs no comment. But it may be well to say that, whilst this is
true, it is equally true that such repeal would be a gross abuso of powor, being contrary to the spirit and meaning of the Constitution, which are as much
to be observed as it-s letter. For incontestably the Constitution contemplate,
that Congress shnll alwnys furnish a writ for the protection of citizens, except when in case of invasion or rebellion it may thrnk public safety requires
a. suspension of that protection. E1•er1. sound statesman and lawyer will
ae;ree, that a wilful violation of the mnntfest spirit of the Constitution is mora1ly as bad as an infraction of its plain letter.
'l'he argument further says: "The President is a civil magietrat-e, not a
military chief," and because of "tho prev1\ilinl;\: sentiment that the military
ought to be held in strict subordination to the civil power," they contend the
President was made commander-in-chief of the army, &c. " To call the Judiciary the civil power, iind the President tho military power, is at once a
mistake of fact and an abuse of language." All this is a groSI blunder. So
gross is the blunder, that it is incomprehensible ho,v it could be committed by
gentlemen of intelligence. If the commander-in-chief of the military is not
to be understood as included when speakin~ of the whole "military power,"
in the no.mo of common sense, who can be rncludod 7 The phrase, "the military in subordination to the civil power," is borro,ved from English political
enactments, law writers, and historians. In that country it hM been uniformly understood not to class the King with the civil, but the military power.
The military being always in strict subordination to him, there would be no
signilbance in tho phrase, if it referred to his as part of the civil power. By
"civil power" is meant tho law administered by its own appropriate functionaries-the Judiciary. In other words, the distinct intention is, that when
the power of the sword and the power of the law come in conflict the sword
must yield. This is well illustrated by our State Constitutions, which, whilst
making tho Governor commander-in-chief of the military, adopt this phrase
into their bill of rights, saying: "The military shall always be held in exact
subordination to the civil power," or using some similar language. Surely,
110 much paiWJ would not have been taken to do thia, if tho Governor was in•
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tended n:s part of that civil power, when the Constitation bad already placed
the military in subordination v.> him as its commander-in-chief.
'l'he reS'Ult of the discussion is-first, the President has, ~-qtftcio, no power
of arrest, and none being conferred by Congress, he Cl\n have none. Second,
but even if he has such power, no matter bow derived, it must be exercised
in tho manner prescribed by th-e Constitution; that is, there must be in ea-0h
case prohable cause sustained by both, and an order of arrest particularly de'Bcribmg the person to be arrested, which cannot be issued by deputy. Third,
the President has no power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
-corpus, that power resting in the discretion of Congress alone, consequently
\lven if his power of arrest and imprisonment were conceded, still the legality
-of the mode in which it is exercised is subject to Judicial investigation, and
to this 'fll'ld, for the necessary protection of the rights of citizens, he, like every
other officer is subject to the control of the hnv through its appointed
functionaries.
Here might appropriately close a mere review of what purports to be the
opiuion of the Attorney-General, but which carries with it ample grounds for
.suspicion that it ma,v not be an opinion, but only the argument of an official
-advocate. But this 1s not intended as such mere review, but as a comment on
that and analogous topics. Amon~ these is that kindred one of martial law,
which, for abundant reaBons, no doubt, both the President in his message,
and the Attorney in his opinion, carefully abstain from saying one word
about, though the authority to declare martial law issued cotemporarily with
that to suspend the writ, and, of the two, is much the major usurpation of
power. But the President's obsequious partizans in Congress have not been
so abstinent or prudent. Some of them infer the uselessness of the protection
<>f the writ, in the presence of assumed power to declare martial law, whilst
-others argue in favor of the latter power from the n1:1sumed power over the
writ. 'l'h,e subject, therefore, cannot be properly disposed of without some
notice of the claimed power to declare martial law. But, as this ha1:1 already been done by the writer, at some lenj!th, in a printed pamphlet, what is
now to be said will be as brief as practicable.

4. M,utTUL L.1o.w.
The books furnish no better definition of martial Jaw than that &iven in
Jacobs' Law Dictionary: '' The law of war that depends upon the JUSt but
arbitrary power and pleasure of the king or bis lieutenant. He useth absolute -power, so that his word is Jaw." "A distinction should be made between
martial law, as formerly executed, entirely at the discretion of the crown,
and unbounded in its authority either as to persons or crimes, and that at
present established, which is limited as to both." In other words, martial
law is the will of the military commander who proclaims it.
As agreed on all hands, it has been forever abolished in .England since the
petition of right, has not been known there for near two centuries, bas been
'h eld by Lord Lo'ughborough to be incompatible with the genius of the English
Constitution, and, all authorities concur, can only be established by the
-omnipotent power of Parliament.
Are we liable no such a law in this country? Can our free citizens be
made the slaves of a military despot? That is the question. Our Generals
have been authori'zed by President Lincoln, so far as he could authorize, to .
proclaim martial law, and Gen. Fremont has actually proclaimed and is now ·
enforcing it over some hundred and sixt,v thousand of our countrymen at St.
Louis; this, too, without any proclamation of rebellion against that city, or ·
against the State of Missouri. Any State adhering to the Union is equally
liable to be treated in the same way. It is, therefore, a pressing question of :
the greatest moment to the whole nation.
.As far as can be ascertained, and as believed, there was no attempt to, estabi .
lish martial la-w during the seven yea.rs' war of the Revolution. Nor,w.as .
there any during the three years' war of 1812, except that of Jaokao&,-,which,,
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as before stated, was firs, condemned as illegal and void by an inteliigerrt
court martial, then by the District Court of the United St.ates, and afterward!f
'by the Appellate Court of Louisiana.
J udge Bay, of the Appellate Court of South Carolina, thirty or forty yean
:ago decided in the same way, saying: "If by martial law is to he understood
·that dreadful system, the law of arms which in former times ,vas exercised
·by the King of England 1md his lieutenants, when his word was the law aµd
·his will the power by which it was exercised, I have no hesitation in s:i.ying
that snch a monster could not exist in this land of liberty and freedom."
When the question of the refunding of Jackson's fine ,vas before Congress,
the subject was referred by each Honse to its Committee on the Jndfoiary.
'l'he report of the Committee of the Honse of Representatives was written by
a. member who has since obtained such an enviable reputation for pure,
·enlightened, unimpassioned statesmanship, as Senator Pearce, of Maryland.
'fhe report speaks thus:
"Your committee do not think that the military commander has any rights
or duties paramount to the Constitution, from which he derives his com·
mission. lf such officers do possess powers above the Constitution and the
•law of the land, of the extent nod application of which they, and they alone
rmay jndg~, and if the Constit~tion and Jaw cannot protect the citizen a9aio~t
, the exermse of such extraordinary, undefined and undefioable powers, toen rs
• our frame of government a solemn mockery-then are oar bills and declara' tions of rights idle and unmeaning forms, and the boasted liberty of an
.·.American citizen is but a.n empty sound.
"It wonld be still more monstrous if, besides suspending the habeas corpt~
,·and detaining a citizen, it should be claimed to try and execute him by martial
~law, which is not tolerated in England, nor in any countty exoopt where des•
!J>Otism reigns.
"This doctrine of necessity, which at one time is said to abrogate the Con•
, stitution and all law, and at another to justify the invasion of a. part of fro~
>'Jllen's privileges that the rest may be preserved, has long been known: as the
tyrants plea. It is not tolerated in England, no matter what may be the
distemper of the times; and while it is palpably incompatible with the prin•
ciples of American freedom, it is also directly met and ex;pressly denied by
-constitutional provisions.
"The country may, in considerati(lll of great services,· and 11pon aoonemen-t
made, excase the individual who has violated these principles; but whenever
they yield submissively to the invasion of these r1ghts-when~er they are
pre,pared to admit the ty1·anf & plea-they are fit only to be the tyrant/ s
slaves."
A briefer report from the Senate's co=ittee, written by Mr. B'errieo, cotl'demned martial law with equal emphasis.
But now we have the Rhode Island case 7, How, which is clainre·d to recog1 nize the right to establish martial law in this country.
It m:ty be·eaid of tfrn:&
• case, or, at least, of the opinion delivered in it, witborrt fear of contradiction
from any intelligent lMvyer, that it is crude, ill-conside11ld, and most loosely
• expressed.
'l'he question presented for decision was the validity of a statute of' the
L egislature of Rli.ode Island which professed to "establish marthd law over
the State," and wl'Iose validity had been recognized by its Courts. The
Supreme Court decided that this being a matter of pure local statate law, its
decision, according to uniform usage, must conform to- the d·ecision or the
local Courts. Thiis being decided, there was nothing left in the case, and the
remainder of the opinion is mere olYiter dict1tm. So far as the obiter dictaof Chief J ustice Taney in delivering the decision may be construed into an
implied concesaion that Congress may establish martial law tftey are in
direct conflict with bis recent decision in the Merriman case. But it is due
to him to say that there is not the slightest intimation of anJ such power ia
the P resident or other mi1itary commander, and the recognitron of tho power
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in lhe Rhode Island Legislature was, no doubt, caused by the fact of the
people of that State living then under the old colonial charte1·, without the
protection of a written Constitution or bill of rights. From this fact, he and
the State Court most probably inferred a power, like that of the omnipotent
Parliament, t.o establish martial law.
He seems to have la,bored under some loose impression that there was some
other and different kind of martial law intended by the Rhode Island Lcgis,lature than that formerly in use in England, known under the significant
definition of the will of the" military commander"-somethini between that
n.nd the law of Congress, or of a State, for the Government of the army or
militia; for he says: "No more force, however, can be used than is necessary
to m:complish the object; and if the power is used for the purposes of oppression, 01· any injury willfully done to person or property, the party by whom,
or by whose order, it is commitood would undoubtedly be answerable." There
i's nothini:1 of arbitrary power in this, but the reverse. It is nothing but the
kind of power which the mi)itary may lawfully use, and must use, when
en.lied in !\id of the civil authority to suppress rebellion, and entirely within
the limits of the military law as prescribed by Congress. Again, he sars:
"We forbear to remark upon the commissions anciently issued by the king
to proceed against certain descriptions of persons by the law martial. These
eommi~Rion~ were issued by the king at his p leasure, without the concur•
rence -or 11uthority of Parliament, and were often a!Jused for the most despotic,
oppressive purposes. They were finally abolished and prohibited by the peti•
tion of right. But they bear no analogy in any respect to tho declaration o,f
m:irtial law by the legislative authority of the State, made for the purpose
uf ~eif-defense when assailed by an armed force."
Th is shows he must have labored under the delusion referred to; yet he
cou ld scarcely have committed a greater mistake. There is not, never was,
nny such intermediate kind of martial lnw. 'l'he books furnish no trace or
intimation of anything of tho kind. The old martial law is the only one
known or ever beard of. Consequently that and none other must be what is
meant whenever martial law is proclaimed by statute or military order, under
that name or designation. Consequently, also, what he seemingly makes the
Court rmy can have no bearing on the matter under discussion, except as a
strong intimation against the power of even an unrestraine:l Legislature to
esta.hlish the old, the only martial law in this country.
The decision out of the way, how, then, does the matter stand, on principie
and analo~. To decla.re martial law is to make law. lt is to mnke law of
the very h1gheRt character; for it supercedes all other, and, in effect, repeals ·
al!. other !aw, and puts this lnw in tb.eir pince. Now, to make la\v or repeal
law is legislation, and the whole legislative power of the nation, so for as
confided to anybody, is granted exclusively to Congress. 'l'his 11.rgumentalone,
i f there were no other, would be perfectly conelusive against the power of
the President to declare martial law. Por nothing is better established on
principle and by authority than that the President cannot legislate-that is,
make la,v. To permit him to do so would pervert nnd subvert all the great
purposes for which the Government was so carefully divided into separate
uepa.rtments. Consequently if martial law can be established at nil, •it must
be done by Congress. Can Con~ress do it?
That it cannot is obvious. First. Because the Constitution says: " The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, property, and effects
against unreMonable searches n.nd seilmres, shall not he violated ; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
-and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing
to be seized." Every one of these rights thus intended to be guarded are
infringed. by the exercise of murtial law. 'l'his must be so, for otherwise
there could be no reason for martial law, the civil authority already having
-ample power within those limits-unleS11, indeed, martial law is intended to
try and pun ish offenses by some speedy, summary method not known to law.
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This brings us to objection Second, Because the Constitution ~eys: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property ,.itbout duo process of
law." Thnt is, by the law of the lnnd, under the administration of ite ~signed
functionaries-the judiciary.
Third. Decause tho Constitution guarantees to an ncoused n speedy public
trial by jury, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with the witnesses ngninst him, to hove compulsory proce~s for hi&
witnesses, and tbe assistance of counsel, all of which martial law dispenses
with and disregards. lf it did not, the civil law is sufficient, and there enn
bo neither need or use for proclaiming the other. Tho utmost th1u the asnge&
of martial Jaw allow is a drum-bend court martial, and oven for that much tho
accused ie dependent upon the discretion of the commander. He can dispense with all modes of trial, and order an accused to be shot for anything
he chooses to call an offense without any investi_gation whatever.
'I"hese guaranties :-of the Constitution are without exception ns to times of
public danger, or for any supposable case of State necessity, and nre, there•
fore, to be always observed under all circumstancea. Congress hae no discretion to disregard them. They clearly prevent Congress from declaring
martial Jaw. 'fhis construction is fortified by the denunciation of martial
Jnw in tho Declaration of Independence and its express prohibition in all the
State Constitutions, which, being general grants of all power, with specific
exceptions or prohibitions, were supposed to require, out of abundant cnu•
tion, the special inhibition of martml law. But tho Federal Constitution
contains only a grant of specified powers, with an express reservation of all
power not granted, and, there being no ~rant of power to establish martial
law, there was no need for its special prohibition.
But concede the power, can 1t be transferred to the President? No more
than Congress can divest it!elf, by transfer, of any other or all its legislo.tive
power. As before said, to declare mo.rtial law is legislation, a class of po,ver
which he cannot exercise-one which, according to the fundiimental division
of the Government into departments, is denied to him and confined to
Couw.ess.
Still there is necessity, State necessity, tho law of self-defense, self-preservation, inherent in o.11 Governments, which, it is said, Constitutions cannot
take away-a higher Jaw, which overrides o.ll Constitutions. 'I'here is no
reasoning witb higher-Jaw men. 'l'hey are a law and o. reo.son to themselves.
'l'o those not of that clo.ss a short argument will be sufficient. Whatever
force there may be in the o.rgument that Government cannot rightfully take
from an individual the necessary right of self-defense, still it cannot be denied
that Government hns the power to impair that right most materially. For
instance, it has the power, not the right, to deny the right of killin~ in,aeJf.
defense. With much greater propriety can o. nation when institutmg 'Government-that thing of its own, for its own benefit, in which no other person
has a distinct, separable interest-limit its bantlings, means and powers or
self-defense. Whether wise or unwise, it hns the powerif the just power, or
saying: Let the Government perish rather than it sha do certain things.
The perfect equity of such a declaration ia apparent as soon as we reflect ho,-,disputable is what is and whnt is not necessary to Government self-defense.
'I'he nation ho.s the perfect right-nay, it is an impero.tive duty of self-defense,
of self.preservation, to judge all this matter in advance, and say what the
Government may er may not do at any time and under all circumstances.
'!'his is perfectly indispensablf: to the preservation of civil liberty, Bnd, how•
ever it mBy be in other countries, the pre~ervation of civil liberty was the
greBt paramount object with tho founders of our Government; beoanse in iti,
preservBtion was deemed to be involve:! the ha1;>piness and prosperity of the
nation. Unless, then, he and others thinking with him can prove to the satis•
faction of others tho.t they have more wisdom than the nation, together with
more interest in the preservation of its Government, there cannot be, eveo
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theoretically, any just claim to a higher law which shall override the Constitution and limit the ntition'B rightful power jn this particular.
"'l'here is no life fo1· liberty but in the supreme and absolute dominion of
Jaw. '!'his lesson is written, in letters of blood and fire, all over thc history of
rui.tions. It is the moral of the annals of republics ever since their records
began. Whenever men have thought great thoughts, and died brave deaths
for human ri hts, its everlasting truth has been proclaimed and sealed with
patriot blood.9'
But suppose there was, which there is not, a proper analogy between the
right of individual self-defense tind that of Government self-defense. Let us
see how the matter stiinds in that view. Before an individual can take the
law in his own hands and k:iU in self-defense, be must be driven to the wall.
'l'he danger must be immediate, imperative of death or grievous bodily harm,
with no other means ofproba.ble escape, before he can take life in self-defense.
Now, will it be seriously contended that this great nation of twenty millions
is in the presence of such immediate, imperative danger, is so driven to the
wall, that the incarceration of some fifty or a hundr ed suspecred men in Mm·yland or Missouri, or the declaration of' martial Jaw, is absolutely1 indispensahly
necessary to its preservation? Yet that proposition, absurd as it is, must be
proven before the higher-law doctrine cnn be brought to bear, or before the
tyrant's plea can have any application. It is even doubtful whether arbitrary
arrest and martial law in a country like this, of sparce, scattered population,
are any material a.id in suppressing rebellion. It is also doubtful wh<>ther
they can be such aid in the defense of an open, unfortified city like Baltimore
or St. Louis, having a thousand points of ingress and egress, and which has
to be defended from without and not from within. But concede that they are
a material aid, still it cannot be contended that they are, like the knife or the
pistol used in personal self-defense, indispensably neces~ary-that they afford
the only probable means of esca~e from ite danger. ~ot being so iodis~ensa.bly necessary, they do not fullill the conditions of the doctrine of State
necessity and Government riuht of self-defense.
Let us leave higher law, 'state necessity, and this o'ermastcring right of
Government self-defense in that grave, without resuri-ection, where our fathers
fondly hoped they had deeply buried them, together with all the other accursed
.engiuery of tyranny.
Mr. Lincoln need not flatter himself with the hope that posterity, or even
the present generation, will accord him absolution for his usurpation and
arbitrary abuse of power by reason of the equally great or even greater
atrocities perpetrated at the South against civil liberty. That is an example
for his avoidance, not his imitation. 'l'wo wrongs never make a right. Because a murder was committed at Lexington, that is no reason for per01itting
it in Louisville. Because six million of our eountrymen are suffering tyranny,
that is no justification for his making the other twenty million suffer it al1m.
On the contrary, the relief of those six million is the best of bis whole string
of arguments for his war of invasion a,g ainst the South. His inestimable
prestige as the vindicator of the Constitution and the law against causeless
rebellion is taken from him when he himself tramples on the Constitution and
laws. He sinks himself to the level of the rebel President, and becomes the
mere lawless c hief of a rebellion against the Constitution.

5. 'l'Hi;: Two W J.Rs.
'l'he nation is now afilicted with two terrible wars going on together. 'l'he
war against the Union, and a war against the Constitution, are being waged
simultaneously. Each wears a threatening aspect of great pet·il. Which presents the greater peril it would be difficult to decide. Which, if successful,
will be most calamitous, men of intelligence will have no difficulty in deciding,
even tbough they knew that a large majority of our countrymen might decide
differently. So, in determining which of the two is tbe worst treason-the
war against the Union, or the war against the Constitution-men will differ in
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the same way. A patriot cnn side with neither wiir, but must resist them
both. He must do this, even though he brings upon himself an imputation,
from the ignorant, that he thereh} favors one of these wars. 'l'he patriotism
is of little ·w orth which cannot bide the scathing of such imputations.
Independence was a great achievement, but the e~tablishment of civil liberty
was a greater. The forJ,Der was comparatively of JiU!e '\'forth without the latter.
The Union is an inestinmble, nttt1onal benefit, but the Constitution is a still
greater D!Ltional blessing. 'l' he principal value of the Union lies in the pre::1ervation of the Constitution. The Uuion is the vase containing the precious
ointment. Let us not permit the destruction of the ointment for the sak11 of
the va~e. "We cannot yield the jewel to retain the casket." The preservation of the Union is worth a high price, an immense price, but it is not above
all price. We cannot afford to give the destruction of the Constitution as
that p1·ice.
·
We ma1 be said to owe a double allegiance-one to the Union, the other to
the Constitution. Which is paramount, enlighlened patriotism will h:we no
hesitation in deciding. The one is allegiance to mere territorial limits, whilst
the other is also allegiance to civil liberty. The one looks mainly to the physical prosperity·of the nation, whilst the other looks to its moral well-being, its
means of permanent happiness. The one is the ordinary patriotism of all
nations, whilst the other is peculiar to our ourselves, expanding as it
does into a noble philanthropy, embracing the deep interest of all Christendom. 'l'he preservation of our Constitution in its supremacy, its sanctity, its
inviolability, is a great interest in the oause of civil liberty throughout the
world. Its destruction would be the putting out the last lamp of hope to the
nations. They would mourn in rnyless, hopeless gloom. The double fealty to
Union and to Constitution beautifully blended into one, is that double fe!l.lty
to country and to liberty making the proud d-istinctivc patriotilm of our
countrymen.
'Whilst we leave it to President Lincoln, with an army of five hundred
thousand men and a powerful navy to resist the war against the Union, every
citizen should gird himself for the contest in resisting the other war ap:ainst
the Constitut.ion. In this resistanc'! we can expect no aid from the President,
for he himself is the commander-in-chief of all the aggressors. Neither can
it be expected from Congress, subdued as it is into absolute obedience to the
President by lois five hundred million patronage. Neither can it be expected
from any of that large class, di~seminated throughout society, who nre thirsting for a taste of the --Pactolian stream distributed by him. 'l'he odds arc terri•
ble but let us n ot despair. The imminence of the peril should only ser..-e with
true hear~ to nerve "them the stronger.
The celebrated report on r etrenchment, made in 1826, by a committee of
the Senate, of which Mr. VanBuren, Mr. Benton, and other distinguished
men were members, said·: "Patronage will penetrate this body, subdue its
capacity of resistance, chain it to the ca.r of power, and enable the President
to rule as easily and much more securely with than without the nominal check
of the Semite.
"We must look forward to the time when the nomination by the President
can carry any man through the Senate, and his recommendation carry any
measure through Congress; when the principle of public aetion will be open
and avowed-the President wants my vote, and I want bis patronage. "What
will this be but the government of one man; al'ld what is the government of
one man but a monarchy? Names are nothing. Tlie nature of a thing i~ in
its substance, and the name soon accommodates itself to the substance."
Yet the gentlell)en who niade this report never supposed that this one-man
power would clutch us in less than forty years; they never imagined au annual patrona"e of five hundred million.
President Lincoln, by way of ·extenuation for his usurpation, in his attempt
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, asks, in his message, "Are all the laws
but one to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go to pieces, lest that,
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one be violated?" inliruating thereby that he has, at most, been guilty of violating only one law, one infmction of the Constitution. Let us see.
'l'he following powers are given exc~
y.J p Conii;re~s :-]. To increase
the army. 2. 'l'o increase the navy. 3. To appropriate the nation's money.
4. To regulate commerce with foreign nations.' 5. 'l'o regu late commerce between the Stittes. 6. To contract debt on behalf of the nntion. 7. 'l'o suspend the writ of habeas cm-pus. 'l'he foUowing powers are denied to both
Congress ancl the President :- 1. To proclaim martial law. 2. Arrest without
a legal warrant. 3. Imprisonment or othe1· punishment without conviction
u~n .~tlfal. triJl.J,,_ 4-. .E,'.11aisbment under ex _post facto or . no~-existiug law.
.,4., ~~.\fl~O<k\lit10'"6): l~ij1·~tde i;ar;!:M, l.il\st1le~.,g,nd tbe.m1dn1ght seaet pr:0;ce~~·n;s ~(.thl!•.:!.•~ ~i1Vtfqn. . o. l'he.in~r~tiQt\ of expQrts~. h .. :r~ fimmng,
.~f. (o !~ !fr~ w.~~~qqic.o .of 9tl,-if;.'!,, ,.7., .'J:'he .reg.ulatiop of the cQJllmeri;e
~r_,- 'tq}qviJ,hi,1t,~1jip..bQ1,1~s .. , .'r~.jjll.Qjlir..,the g~e,;lom 1pf.speecl1 o.n4
•~~Ill'e5'., ,JI, . TQ '~C!io.gll t.,he P\:PRk',1. rignf'i'b l,.c~p n,1,1,d be11¥•arm
. s." .J~
.~ii
UJ)1;°e,i&i>~i1i,S~,i\•She5c or seizu_i-A/1-. .•lJ... ;.!;p ,probtb.io-~.lll-ig~ation, Of
reqi!l're passport. lZ, ...(~.clis~is,ii
po.lice ,Pf 11, cit:i:, i't-,an ,.unpi;o.Qlaill!e'.4
State, and appoint others m tl'!"e1r place. Here are nineteen impol'lant Jaws,
or constitutional provisions, which he has grossly, wilfully Yiolated. His ueurpations are so extensi"e, that it would narro,v the inquiry to ask, what Ju IV
or constitutional provision ho has not violated, rather than to ask which he
has violated or usurped upon. 'rbe rights, the safe-guards he bas taken away,
are greater, far greater than those he has left. I t is not a question whether
we shall overlook only n single usurpation as he claims, but whether we shall
countenance such multifarious usurpation; whether the rights and pow~s he
has left to the nation, to Congress, or the Judiciary, are really worth as much
as those he has stolen. These thefts are not to be countenanced or excused
under the pretext of putting down the rebellion, for if he cannot put it down
with an army of five hundred thousand men, and a powerful navy, without
trampling on the Constitution, it is because the thing cannot be accom?lished ,
ancl he could not do it with all the power that could be accumulated rnto his
iocom_petent bands. He has, with the butt-end of his implement, mauled the
Constitution to pieces, and with his foot upon its fragments, he bids the nation
an insolent defiance.
'l'o all this usurpation a venal Congress yields a ser vile acquiescence, and,
notwithstanding the oath of its members to support the Constitution, they accord him the indemnity of their approval. '.l'hey even agg him on to further
usurpations, to other excesses. One Senator asks leave to introduce a bill to
abolish slavery in the rebel States. Another says his party will grnciously
forbear abolition as a means of subduing rebellion, unless it should become
necessary ; but, if it cannot be clone otherwise, they will proclaim abolition,
and almost und isguisedly utters the t hreat of inciting a servile insurrection ;
that is, they will cause the clesohition of eleYen States; they will incite a clo-.
mestic enemy in every household, with knife. and torch,.to the work of de-struction; they will cnuse the indiscriminati, massacre of the innocent women
and children of eleven States. The worst spirit of all p1\0demonium could not
conceive a more infernal purpose This son of New England may think.
that any amount of blood and treasure will be well spent, rather than she,
shall be deprived of the monopoly of the finest market in the world for her
manufactures and shipping. He may think that this war is "a thing that will
pay;" unlike the last war with England, which New E ngland would not support because it was "a thing that would not pay," and to get rid of which she
loudly threatened secession . But he should bethink himself before he deso-latcs those eleven States, whether Kew England can afford much blood or
tren,sure in killing the goose that lays the golden egg for her benefit.
Another Senator, a reputed leader, saicl he proposed to lend the President
t he whole power of the country-arms, men, moner- "and pince ~hem in his
bands with authority almost unlimited." " l want,' he said, "sudden, bold, determined, forw.ard war; and I do not think anybody can conduct war of that.
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kind as \vell as a dictator." This is the avowal of the deliberate purpose to
commit foul treason a*ainst the Constitution in shameless disregard of his
oath for its support. 't hese ail osntiments he deliberately uttered twice
in the Senate without any aderiuate rebuke. Had they been uttered in the
Revolution Cono-ress they would have met a withering rebuke. Tradition
tells us that at tt"e gloomiest period of the Revolution, when a Uritish army
was r ava<ri ng Virginia, a proposition was rn:i.de in her legislature to· make
Patrick Henry dictator. The p,~triot Corbin, a warm fri:ond of Henry,. r ebuked
the proposer, and silenced the proposition, by cahnly siiying: "Your dictatorial crown to his brow, my dag;e1· to bis heart." '-9Mii «;;o i ti j l'l'fi Ufl 11itW,e,
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ns that a Representative from)! nryland was pai that much for publicly thankini tbe President for the i)!no111in ious degradation of his State. lf those papers speak true, another adulator is to be rewarded with a Supreme Judgeship•
for equalling tbe illustrious rail-splitter with Washiniton-ay, showir,g that.
he is to be a greater national benefactor thnn even Washiogton_ Now this
~enator has not only best.owed nearly equal adulation, but by votes, and profuse public promises, bas shown himself prepared to gorge the utmost greed
of the President for power. Be wants him to become a dictator. What position can be too high pay for him?
In a former, recent publication, the ,vritcr, from faith in the President's
supposed amiability and reput.'\tion for integrity in private life, gave him exemption from an imputed design to erect de~potic power on the ruins of the
Constitution for bis own benefit or that of his party. 'l'hat exemption must
now be retracted-more recent developments barn destroyed so much faith
'in that amiability and reputed integrity. H is perseverance, since the meeting
.of Congress, in reiterated gross, wanton, useless vioh,tions of the Constitution
shows that he has no consideration, such as an honest man would have, fou
,t he obligations of his oath t.o support the Constitution, or the obligations of
. duty as a citizen and a President. Whatever he may have boon in private
life, he has shown himself anything but amiable as a President. 'l'hose de·velopments, io connection with the terrible disclosure of views by his indis. creet partisans on the floors of Congress, r equire ·doubts to be substituted for
that exemption. Vvhetber he lacks intelligence to see the infinite, permauent
injury he is infl.ictin~ upon the country by his bad example-whether he is
possessed by the weak man's foible, and is seeking vengeance for all the opp robrium cast by the South upon himself and his party-whether he has.
Joined a conspiracy .for giving himself, or party, permanent power on the ruins.
of the Constitution-or whether he has blindly yielded himself to the guidance
of bad men ,rho have fasteued themselves upon him, and who will surely lead
him to bis own perdition, or that of tho country, must be left for after-developments to determine.
As an indication of the purpose of the reigninl!: party t.o clothe its chief
• with dictatorship, all notice should not be omitted of a bill pendin~ before the
, Senate at the adjournment of Congress, which would have P.assed 1f the1·e bad
been time, as proved by test votes, and whioh, no doubt, will p!tcss at the next
- session. It substantially gives the President or the military commander
power to declare martial Jaw over any State or district proclaimed to be in re0bellion. I t says, "the commander shall make such police rules and r egula•
tions as lie rnay durn 11ecessary to suppress rebellion, and all the civil authoriiies shall be bound to carry said rules and regulations int.o effect;" but if they
fail to do so, then the commander shall enforce them.. What is meant by po_Jice r egulations " necessary to suppress rebellion" n.o, man can tell, unless it.
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means, as it seems 'to do, suoh as the commander may choose to think necessary. Here is power to be given, and a command to legislate over an entire
State. Nor is this confined to such States as have no organized civil government, except such as is aiding rebellion, but applies equally to any State
which the President may choose to declare in rebellion, though it has a loyal
government honestly aiding in the suppression of the rebellion. Another section suspends the writ of habeas COl:JJUS as to n.11 persons "det.-iined by military
authority," without saying how long the suspension shall last. Another sec•
tion says, "all persons found in arms against the United States, or otlierwise
aiding tlieir eneniies, shall be detained as prisoners for trio.I, or may at once
be placed before a court martial to be d1mlt witll according to the rules of
war in respect to unorganized armed bands not recognized as regular troops."
What those rules of war are the writer does not know, but supposes they authorize death. But what every lawyer and every man of intelligence does
know, is, that this is a most disgracefully loose mode of legislation, oven if
Congress had tho po,ver-this reterring to the unknown and unascertainablo
"rules of war" to determine whether e. citizen shall be shot by order of 1\
court martial, or shall have a fair trial by the law of the land. If a citizen
not in arms is found doin<r what a court martial may choose to think an aiding of the rebels, he maybe instantly sbot. This is splendid legislation for a
free R epublic. What an admirable engine for tyrannical persecution. J ackson thought a respectful published remonstrance against the continuance of
bis martial law, long after the defeat and withdrawal of the enemy, was an
aiding of the enemy, nod prosecuted the publisher before a court martial.
Why may not a packed court martial think that any spoken, w1·itten, or
printed censure of the President, the commander, or one of their subordinates,
or any other trivial mntter at which either may choose to take personal
offense-such, for instance, as censure of Abolitionism-is an aiding of the
enemy.
Anothei· section, in the tenderness of congressional mercy, says that sentence of death shall not be inflicted upon persons "taken in arms" with out
the approval of the commander of the military district, leaving the persons
taken not in arms to be immediately executed without any such approval.
'l'he two sections, taken together, authorize the commander of a military distr ict, and his packed court martials, t-0 institute an indiscriminate massacre of
all prisoners however and for whatever taken, contrary to the usages of all
civilized warfare, even among hostile nations, and which usages, as all i;>ublicists ngree, are the least bloody that should obtain in carrying on civ1l war.
(See sections 9f the bill, Appendix E.)
If there be a lower depth of infamy not yet attained in these times of political prostitution and r eckless subservicncy to power, this bill, when passed,
will plumb that depth. Baseness can dive no deeper into the pool of de~radation. 'l'o permit a packed court martial, contrary to the usages of civil war,
recognized in all the civil wars of England and in our own long revolutionary
war, to authorize the massacre of prisoners taken with arms in their hands,
would be a lasting disgrace inflicted upon the character of the nation, for
wbich even the lives of every member voting for the bill would be little more
than an adequate atonement. Their lasting disgrace, with every intelligent
man here and abroad, now, and in the long future, is a part of the penalty
they will certainly have to pay. So keen is their appetite for blo(\d and venseance, that they are reckless of the fact, that such a procedure necessarily
mvolves the equal massacre of all northern men taken prisoners by the
armies of the South. But, worse than even this, if worse there can be,
is the permission to a packed court martial to authorize the putting to
death by a military commander of any citizen or citizens ho may choose
to say were aiding or abetting the rebels. What sort of aiding or abetting shall authorize the infliction of death tlie bill does not say. 'l'hat
is all left to the discretion of our mmtary masters. Now, the degrees and
modes of aiding and abetting are infinite; some authorizing the imposition of
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only a small fine, others a. short imprisonment, ascending, like other crime, in
gradation, until the attaining of such aiding and abetting as amounts to trea•
son, which deserves death. All these are massed together without discrimination, the military being authorized to inflict death for the lightest as well as the
greatest. 'l'hese men have not th'e sense, or, if they have the sense, they have
not the mercy, to discriminate between a public trial before a comt of law,
by an impartial jury, both court and jury actin~ under an imposing responsibility to the public sense of justice, and a trial before a drum-bead court
martial. The com·t and jury are trammeled with legal precedents of a thousand years, strictly defining what is an aiding and abetting of trei,son within
the meaning of the law. On the other hand, the court martial is trammeled
with nothing but their own discretion, or, rather, their s ubserviency to their
commander. A political opinion differing from tbat of the ruling party, an
imprudent word, written or spoken, of complaint against our masters, or any
other trivial matter, may be made the pretext for the assassination under the
sanction of this bill.
Have we come to this? Does a political party dare thus attempt to confer
such an engine of tyranny upon their party chief-thus clothe him with the
power of merciless persecution against their opposcrs? Do they think that
all sense of justice, all appreciation of liberty, is dead with the nation-that
nothing can arouse it from its lethargy? Are we to permit the fastening upon
us martial law-that is, the will of a commander-in lieu of law·, under the
new phrase of "police regulations," or the old one of "aiding and abetting,"
expounded by military des~ots?
Mr. Lincoln has not waited for the passage of this bill. Martial Jaw has
already been proclaimed at St. Louis, with an accompanying decla.ration that
all infraction of its rules will be "promptly punished;" three newspapers
have been suppressed, and quiet dtizens of the first respectability an•eijted
and deported to distant Ba.stiles; this, too, without any proclamation of
rebellion against eithet· the State or the city.
Mr. Lincoln can easily create a rebellion whenever he wants one. To do
this he need only repeat in any State having the semblance of power to resist
what he has already done in the two unproclaimed States of Maryland and
Missouri, and he will have, not rebellion in aid of disunion, but within the
Union, under the national flag, against unconstitutional oppression. When
he hns created the rebellion he can is$ue bis proclamation, and then will come
this act of Congress pretending to legalize his dictatorship. His partisans
may pretend to think his discretion may be safely trusted not to abuse such
power; but the Constitution places no such reliance on any man's forbearance or discretion. Neither is the nation disposed 01· bound so to trust him
or any other President. He who could allow, without even public rebuke,
three repetitions of wanton mnssacrcs by his German soldiers in the streets
of St. Louis of unolfending men, women, and children, and he who imposes
such needlessly rigorous imprisonment upon citizens as respectable 11s himself
or any memher of his Cabinet for no cause but that of their politictil opinfons
in favor of the right of secession, deserves not to be so trusted.
As to a practical dictatorship, that is past praying against. We already
have a cictatoi·sh ip. ,vith a subsenient Congress, with an obedient enormous army, with an active assisting civil corps of a hundred, and soon to be
increased to two hundred thousand, with hundreds of thousands of partakers
and of hungry seekers of patronage, with a muzzled press and a powerless
Judiciary, Mr. Lincoln is now tho master of this nation. His will is everywhere law. 'l'he dictatorship is in full force. All that is left for us is to do
what we may to prevent its becoming a permanent institution.
The higher-law doctrine, that last refuge of fanaticism, after a thor,)llgh
defeat in the field of argument, was forever buried, as it was hoped, under an
immovable load of national contempt and odium. But we find it now not only
resuscitated into new life, but with vastly increased vigor. From the mere
shil.>boleth of a powerless faction of fanatics, it has been inaugurated by the
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President and hiij higher-law Cabinet into the ruling principle of the Government. 'l'hey hiwe cunningly dropped its old name of odium and reproach,
substituting that more imposing one, the law of war. They tell us thnt ours
is a mere fair-weather Constitution- not made for the storruy weather of war
or rebellion; that whilst peace has its Constitution and laws, war has also its
appropriate law, super ceding the other-thii< supreme, paramount Jaw of war
being the unbridled will of its commander-in-chief. 'l'his is the recognized
higher law of the day, which is openly claimed to be above nil constitutionnl
restraint-. It is, on a larger scale, what has been long known in this country
under the name of lynch law.
What a calumny upon the great founders of the Republic to say the frame of
Government formed by them with so much care was intended merely as a fairweather Const,itution ! It contemplates wars and rebellions, and gives the
needful power for dealing with both; yet it was intended not to have sway
during war or rebellionJ. During war and rebellion it was to be suspendedand by what? By that thing, of a.II others the most abhorrent to the men of
the Revolution- that then detested and forever execrable thing, a military despotism. If military despotism can ever be an indispensable aid in carrying
on war, it must have been for precisely that seven years' war through which
they had just passed-11. feeble people struggling for independence against a
powerful enemy, aided by tens of thousands of tories and traitors. If ever
there was a military commander fit to be trusted with arbitrary power, they
knew Washington to be that man. But they gave him no such trust; they
acquiesced in no such supposed necessity for mil itary dominance; but, by
their proud, successful E\Xample, gave the lie to the foul imputation upon
republican institutions, and taught their posterity that there never could be
need, under any circumstances, fo1· a military dictatorship.
Again, we have the example of ·tho last war with England, as righteous a
war as was ever waged by one nation against another, yet during Jts whole
progress denounced by a powerful political party, in and out of Congress, by
public speeches and Urn public press, togP.ther with endless charges of corruption and imbecility against the Administrntion. Such was the ascerbity ttnd
untiring zeal of that party, that, having entire political control of New Eng•
land, it rendered the whole of that large part of the nution's population and
wealth ahno.,t I?erfoctly neutral in the war, iiving the Government no aid, but
hanging upon 1t like a p,1lsied limb. During the sacking and burning of
Washin~ton City, and the immediately succeeding attack on Baltimore-in
fact, durin)! the yoars of ri~orous blockade of our ports, the opposition never
ceased to thunder forth their denunciations against the war and the Administration. Did the Administration resort to arbitrary measures to silence this
opposition, or to protect itself a.guiast tbe secret machinations of suspected spies
und traitors? Not so. 1'io man, no press wns disturbed for political opinion.
If the policy of the present Administration bad been pursued, not a prominent
politicinn or editor of the 'Federal party in New En~land would have been loft
outside ,\ jail. But President Madison t,nd bis Cabmet were imbued with the
true spirit of the Revolution. 'l'hey recogn ized the supremacy of the law as
t-he indispensable price of liberty I at nil times, and under all circumstances,
and they bowed to it in willing obedience.
The pretest of any absolu~e _oeces~ity f?r the nr~itr~ry unconstitutional
measures now adopted as an aid m supprcssmg rebellion 1s a mere sham. It
is a pretext gotten up, not for national protection, but for political persecution.
It is a mere absurdity to contend that the protection of this great nation of
twenty million needs the institution of mu.rtial Jaw- the arbitrary, lawless
suppression of a few newspapers-and the imprisonment of ti few hundred
suspected persons, scattered through the country. Party vengeance, not
national safety, must be the true motive. All that those presses and suspected persons could possibly do, would not impair the strength of the Government half so much-oay,not a t~ntb part so much- as such manifestations
of a deliberate purpose of the President to cast himself free from all constitu-
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tional restrnint, and to put himself above the law. Such a course, if there
,vere no alternative, would drive teas of thousands of loyal Union men to the
dire alternative of aiding either the rebellion against the Union or the rebellion
against the Coflstitution. But there being another, a far better alternative,
thcv will aid neither. Hence, teas of thousands of those who otherwise would
be ·active, zeiilous supporters of the Goverument, are driven iutv inactive
neutrality, aod to that extent its strength is crippled and impaired.
'l' he whole theory upon which the policy of arbitrary, illegal coercion rests,
if not mere" pusilanimit_v," a~ said by Mr. Dana, is a total misconception of
the character of our people. There is nothin~ in the whole circle of Go,,ern•
mentor individual operations which they hold in such utter abh orrence as
arbitrary, illegal oppression. Give the enemies of the Government the means
of playing upon, exciting this feeling, and you furoi~h them an aid of great
potency, whilst you correspondingly weaken the Government, Look at the
opposite examples of Kentucky and Missouri. The latter had, at the com•
mencementof thesetroubles,as proved by the elections, a much far@:et· proportion
of Union meu than the former. 'l'hey both had the misfortune of hiwing Gov•
ernors and Legislatures with secession proclivities, or, at least, sympathies.
The true Union men of both States implored the President to let them aloneto leave to tbem the management of the seceders. 'l'he prayer from Kentucky
was heeded, the consequence bein.~ that she was placed, and has been kept,
in 1i position which Gen. McClelland has said is worth to the Government an
army of forty thousand men. Missouri was not so fortunate. .A. malign influence intervened between ber true Union men and the President. 'l'he policy
of coercive intervention was tried upon her. 'l'he consequence was that her
position now costs the Government an army of .more than fortv thousand
men. i:io much for the coercion policy. It should never be foi~gottcn that
Americans are unused to coercion-are impatient under it-don't like to see
it canied on; and, therefore, it should neYer be used but as a last resort-a
dire necessity. The most respectable, intelligent, unwa ,,ering Union men of
).1issouri still insiRt that, beyond all doubt, if they had been let alone, the
result would have been the same there as in Kentucky.
'l'he writer was the first Union man in Kentucky ,vho publicly ad,·ocated
any 5ort of coercion as a remedy for the rebellion of the 8outltern States.
'l'his he did on the 10th of April last. Io accordance with what he then
thought., and still believes, was the almost undivided opinion of the thinking
men of K entucky, he said: "Coercion by an invading army is what no intelli~ent person does, or ever did, contemplate. The evils would be infinite, without
any compensatin" benefit from such a course." What he recommended was
the collection of ~nties on ship-board, off the Southern ports. The impotency
of the Southern Confedemcy to r elieve itself from this sort of coer cion,
together with the burthcn of taxation, would, it was thought, bring the
Southern people t-0 their senses. lf not, then the forcible re-opening of tho
navigation of the Mississippi and recapture of New Orleans were looked to
for accomplishing the object. 'l'his, with the addition of a rigorous blockade,
is substantially the plan of Gen. Scott, as divulged in his conversation with
tbe editor of the New York Times previous to the battle of Bull Run. Somet hing like it is also believed to have been the plan of the President when he
issued his first proclamation. The call for three months volunteers is full
proof that he did not contemplate a serious invasion. No man of sense would
have thought of depending upon that description of troops for an ill\'asion.
Rumor says he was driven from this policy, n.od made to adopt that <Jf invasion, by the caucns dictation of nine or ten Governors of Northern States,
rabid partisans, as indispensably necessary to the salvation of their yarty.
Be all this as it may, it is worthy of consideration whether it is not stil best
to resume something like that original plan.
With nn army of seventy thousand moo to guard Washington, and threaten
Virginia; another of twenty t,bousaod to guard Fortress Monroe, and threaten
Norfolk and Charleston; and another of for ty thousand to guard :Missouri,
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and threaten Memphis, would put invasion from the South at defiance; whilst
comparative small army sent by sea might conquer and hold New Orleans.
'l'hat place is so completely the heart of Louisio.oa that its conquest and
holdin~ would necessarily be followed by the immediate submission of the
whole ::;tate; whereas the taking of Richmond, or any other Southern city,
will amount to little more than the conquest of the ground on which the
invadin~ army will be encamped.
Louisiana detached, the ::iouthern Confederacy is broken up. 'l'he Confederacy cannot last without her. Mississippi, Arkansas, and 'l'exas must
soon foHow wherever sbe goes. The balance would be too feeble to hold
together. Be8ides, the opinion has been, and still is, confidently entertained
that, if the irritation of active war is r emoved, the people of the South cannot
be brought to stt,nd the loss of more than two cotton crops. 'l'his plan permits the r eduction of the army to little over two hundred thousand-perhaps
even less-with good hope of terminating the war in two years. According to
the opinion of many men full as wise as Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet the
present plan does not promise a termination of the war in less than four to
seven years, with an equal chance of provin" unsuccessful in a permanent sub•
jugation, and which, if successful, would leave the two sections in no condition of feeling to remain parts of the same nation.
A defensive war by the North, whilst it "ould not·increase or intensify the
bad feeling of the sectirms, is dictated by every principle of sound policy.
Many sagacious men deem it by far the most expeditious mode of terminating
the war. The North is far less interested in its speedy termination than the
South. The maintenance of an army of two hundred thousand will soon
exhaust the resources of the Southem Government, unless in repelling a war
of invasion. In resisting that, their citizens will contribute the last dollar.
In its ,ibsence, they cannot be induced to stand for two years enormous tax,ition and total loss of trade. If they iittewpt the disadvantageous policy of a
war of invasion ag3inst the North, it would require two men to our one.
The raising of an army of five hundred thousand men, if at all practicable,
which many doubt, is a thing greatly to be deprecated, and avoided if possible. Suppose the war successful, what is to be done with five hundred
thousand armed men after it is over. 'fbe soldier's life is a comparatively
easy one. After a few years men become fond of it. The pay is better than
for any kind of common hard labor. llfcn and officers become disinclined to
exchange for any mode of dull, progging industry. Let it be remembered
that full one-half of these men will be foreigners, and that all will be great!J
disappointed as to the amount of plunder they expect to gather. What will
hinder them from helpinp: themselves out of the Northern cities? These men
will be the masters of the nation. 'l'here will be no means of resistance.
They can do with the country what they please. It would be merely ridicu•
Ions to base any expectation on their supposed respect for the Constitution
and laws after thelessons taught them by Mr. Lincoln. .Apparent as it now
must be to e,·ery one bow impracticable is a sudden crushing out of the
rebellion by the application of were force, without waiting the aid of slower
influences, the grand deside1·atum should be the keeping down of the army
to the lowest possible number. Precipitation and precipitators have had their
day. 'l'heir discomfiture accompanied that of Bull Run. All pltms should
be carefully revised, and precipitation should be no part of the one adopted.
It has been shown that the terrible blunder of coercive intervention in
Missouri bas lo8t, in what would have been her quiet neutrality, the equivalent for an army of forty thousand men, and, by throwing her into her present
position, imposed a burthen on the Government equal to an army of forty
thousand, the great result of the blunder being eighty thousand. 'l'he war of
invasion has proved still more injurious to the 1Jnion cause. Previous thereto
it was doubtful whether, upon a fair vote, the Union men were not the majority
in most of the seceded States. Since then there ar e no Union men anywhere
left, except in West Virginia, East Tennessee, and a few sparsely scattered
n.
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through Middle and West Tennessee. The war bas consolidated the people,
with tbat ell:ception, into a unanimous, unchanieable spirit of resistance for
as long as it may last. If it should be pushea actively forward for two or
three years, the two sections will come to hate each other as bad as ever the
English and French did. Such an animosity would leave a reconstruction of
the Union scarcely desirable. Still immediate peace or o. recognition of the
independence of the seceded Sta.tes ie not to be thought of. If Louisiana is
permitted to go, the peace would not last o. year. 'fhe vast porulation on the
upper waters of the Mississippi will never submit to her fina separation; a
mere free transit to and from the Gulf will not siitisfy them. Having no
vessels suitable for ocean navigation,wha.t they need and will have iR a market .
at New Orleans, encumbered with no sort of tax, where they can obtnin their
own supplies, and furnish Mexico, South America, and the l shinds. '!'he
South is in no temper yet to yield Louisiana.. She mny be brought to that
temper in eighteen months, if the irritation is not kept at fever heat by an
active prosecution of the wa.r. Satisfy the Southern people thnt the Govern•
ment does not mean a war of subjugation or viudictive persecution, and it is
next to impossible that a majority of them will continue to submit to enormous
taxation and the loss of the st.le of two entire cotton crop~. '!'hey will force
their Government to yield Louisiana and Western Virginia !\8 the price of
peace, though they may have a well founded fear that their Confederacy
cannot last without L ouisianlJ.. '!'he point of honor will be saved, their inde·
pendence acknowledged, and tbey will trust to fortune for the balance.
ohould the ultimate result be the permanent separation of Virginia, the
Carolinas, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, that would be far better for us
than the further prosecution of this war, whose termination no candid, intel•
ligent man co.n pretend to foresee. But should the anticipated split of the
Confederncy take place, thnt separation would not be permanent; but, after
the lapse of a few year1S, reconstruction of the whole would be the most proba•
ble ultimate result.
There ie some danger of reaction at the North, running to the extreme of
a. precipitate and improvident peace. '!'his may come from any one of several
causeij-fa.ilure to raise troops, failure to raise money, another serious disa-ster
in the field, or the interference of England or France. The timidity shown
as to the amount of taxation, and its entire postponement for a ~oar, indi•
cate a want of confidence in the public sentiment of the North. 'Ihe papers
from that quarter tell us that enlisting n.lready begins to dralj heavily before
the place of the discharged three montho men has been supplied. The resignation of two hundred officers since the late disaster looks as if zeal was flag•
ging. A defensive w11r, with a rigorous blockade, would not require h:ilf as
much in men or money, and would be within the easy ability of the North.
In the opinion of very many ha.vino- the best means for judiing the temper
nnd resources of the South, this mode of conducting the war 1s the best for its
speedy termination, and the only one for a reconstruction of the Union. 1t
has the further recommendation of removing all pretext for any of those out•
rages on the Constitution which are filling the hen,rts and minds of good men
evorywhere with gloomand despondency.

APPEND I X.
A
l!lXTRACTS PRO:ll CALHOUN'S 8P€EOB ON JACKSON'S PROTEST,

Under our system, all who exercise power are bound to show, when
questioned, by whnt authority it is e:tercised; to show, in a ,'lord, the express
grant of the power. I proclaim it a~ a truth, as unquestionable truth, of the
h ighest import, that the President has no right to exercise any implied or
constructive power. l speak upon the auth ority of the Constitution itself1
which, by an express grant, has vested all the implied constructive powers in
Congress, and in Congress alone. Hear what the Constitution says: Con•
gress $hall have power "to mn.ke all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other _powers vested
by th is Constitution in the Government of the United States, or m any depart<
tnent or ofllcer thereof.''
Comment is unnecessary; the result is inevitable. The Executive, no
department, can exercise any power without ex_press grant from the C-0nsti•
tution, or by authority of law. A most noble, wise provision, full of the most
impor tant consequences. By it ours is made emphatically a constitutional
nnd le1pl Government, instead of a Government controlled by the discretion
or caprice of those appointed to administer and execute its powers. By it
our Government, instead of consisting of thr ee independent, separate, con·
flioting, hostile department~, hns all its power blended harmoniously into one,
without the danger of conflict, and without destroying the separate, indep endent existence of the parts. Let us p,wse for a moment to contemplate
this admirable provision, the 3imple but efficient contrivn.nce by which these
happy t esult8 are secured.
·
) t has been often said that this provision of the Constitution wa~ unneoes•
sarJ; that It grew out of abundant cnution to 1·emove the possibility of a
doubt ::is to the existence of implied or constructive powers; and that they
would have existed without it, and to the full extent that they now do. '!'bey
who consider this provision as mere surplusa11e do great injustice to the
wisdom of those who framed the Constitution.
~hall not deny that implied
or cOn$truct,lve powers would have existed, and to the full extent as they
now do, without this provision; but, bad it been omitt~1 a most import-ant
question would have been left open to controversy-where woulcl they
r eside-in each department? VIould each have the ri«ht to interpret its
own powers, and assume, 011 its own will and responsibility, all the powers
necessary to carry into effect those granted to it by the Constitution? What
would have been the consequence? Who can doubt that a state of perpetual,
danger ous conflict between the department~ would be the necessary, inevitable result, and that the strongest would ultimately absorb all the powers of
the other departments? Need I designate which is that strongest? Need I
prove that the Executive, as the armed interpreter, vested with the {atronage
of the Governru.ent, would ultimately become the sole expounder o the Con•
stitution? lt was to avoid this dangerous conflict between the depn.rtments,
and to provide most effectually ag1tinst the abuses of discretionary or implied
powers, that this provision has vested all the implied po,vers in Congress.
Instead of a question of right, he makes it a question of duty, and thus
inverts tho order of things, referring his rights to his duties, instead of his
duties to his rights, forgetting that rights always precede duties, the duties
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being, in fact, what the rights impose, and, of course, that duties do not confer
power, but impose obedience-obedience, in his cMe, to the Constitution ond
laws in the discharge of his official duties. The opposite view, that on which
he nets, would give to the President the right to assume whaternr duty h e
might choose, and then convert such duties into powers. This, if admitted,
would render him as absolute as the Autocrat of Russia.

B
EXTRACTS FF.OM WEBSTER'S SPEECH ON JACKSON'S PROTEST.·

'l'he first object of a free people is the preservation of their liberty; and
liberty is only to be maintained by constitutional r estraints and just divisions
of political power. Kothin~ is more deceptive or more danii:erous than the
pretense of a desire to simplify Governm ent. The simplest Government.ii are
despotisms; the next simplest limited monarchies; but all republics, all Gov·
ornmcnts of law, must impose numerous restraints and limitations of authority.
They must be subject to rule nod r egulation. This is the very essence of free
political institutions. The spirit of li berty is, indeed, a bold and fearless
spirit; but it is also a siiarp-sighted spirit. It is a cautious, sti<racious, farseeing intelligence. I t is j ealous of encroachment, jealous of po~ver, j ealous
of man.• It demands eh eeks; it seeks for guards; it insist.ii on securities ; it
entrenches itself behind defences, and fortifies with all possible care against
the assaults of ambition and passion. It does not trust the amiable weaknesses of huml\o nature; and, therefor e, 1oill not permit power to overstep its
prescribed limits, though benevolence, good intent, and patriotic intent come
along with it. lt seeks for duration and permanence. Jt looks back and
before; and, building on the experience of oges which are past, it labors dili~eutly for the benefit or uges that are to come. This is the nature of constitutional Zibert!!; THIS Is oun LIBERTY. A separation of departmen ts, and tho
pt eservi1tion ot the lines of divis ion between them, is the fundamental idea in
the creation of nil our Constitutil'ns; and, doubtless, the continuance of regulated liberty depends on the maintenance of these boundaries.
Ther e is a strong disposition mooing throuo-h the whole protest to represent
tbe Es:ecutive as the pecu]i(~r protector of public liberty-the chief security
on which the people are to rely against the encroachments of other branches
of the Government. 'l'o this end the protest spreads and dwells upon the
President's official oath. Would the writer of the protest argue that the oath
itself is any gr ant of power; or that because the President is to preserve,
protect, and defend the Constitution, he is, therefore, to use what means he
pleases, or any means for such preservation, protection, and defense, except
those which the Constitution and laws have specially given him? Such an
argument would be preposterous; but if the oath be not cited for this preposterous purpose, with what design is it thus displayed unless it be to support
the idea that the maintenance of the Constitution and the preservation of the
public liberties are especially confided to the safe discretion, the true moderation, the paternal guardianship of Es:ecutive power?
The proposition is that the duty of defending the Constitution against the
representatives of the States a nd the representatives of the people results to
him from the nature of his office, and that the founders of our Republic have
given to this duty peculiar solemnity nod force.
Mr. President, the contest for ages has been to rt$C·ue liberty from the gra3p
of Executioe pQtcer. Whoever has engaged in her sacred cause, from the
days of the downfall of those great aristocracies which stood between king
and people to t he time of our own independence, has struggled for the accomplishment of that single object. On the long list of the champions of human
freedom there is not one name dimmed by the reproach of advocating the
extension of Exe-cutive authority. On the contrary, the uniform and steady
purpose of all such champions has been to limit and r estrain it. To this end
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all tba.t could be gained from the imprudence, snatched from the weakness,
or wrung from the necessities of crowned heads has been carefully gathered
up, secured, and hoarded as the rich treasures, t he very j ewels of liber ty. '£0
this end popular and representative right has kept up its warfare against
prerogative with various success ; sometimes writing the history of a whole
age with blood-sometimes witnebsing the martyrdom of Sydneys and
Russells-<>ften baffled and repulsed, but still gaining, on the whole, and
holding what it gained with a grasp that nothing but its own extinction could
compef it to relinquish.
Through all this history of the contest for liberty, Executive power bas
been rega.rded as a lion that must be caged. So far from being the object of
enlightened popular trust-so far from being considered the natural protection
of popular right-it has been dreaded as the great object of danger.
Who is he so ignorant of the history of liberty at home and abroad-who
is he from whose bosom all infusion of American spirit has been so entirely
evaporated-as to put into the mouth of the President the doctrine that the
defense of liberty naturally results to Executive power, and is its peculiar
duty? Who is he that is generous and confiding towards power where it is
most dangerous, and jealous only of those who can restrain it? Who is he
that, reversing the order of State and upheaving the base, would poise the
pyramid of the political system upon its apex? Who is he that declares to
us, through the President's lips, that tho security for freedom rests in Executive authority? Who is he that belies the blood and libels the fame of his
ancestry by declaring that they, with solemnity of form and force of manner,
have invoked the Executive power to come to the protection of liberty? Who
is he that thus charges them with the insanity or recklessness of thus putting
the lamb beneath the lion's paw? No, sir-no, sir. Our security is in our
watchfulness of Executive powei·. It was the constitution of this department
which was infinitely the most difficult part in the .e;reat work of creating our
Government. To give the Executive such power as should make it useful, and
yet not dangerous-efficient, independent, stroni, and yet prevet1t it from '
sweeping away everything by its military and civil power, by the influence
of patronage and favor-this, indeed, was difficult. They who had the work
to do saw this difficulty, and we see it. If we would maintain our system,
we shall act wisely by preserving every re~traint, every guard the Constitution has provided. When we and those who come after have done all that we
can do, and all that they can do, it will be well for us and for them if the
Executive, by the power of patronge and party, shall not prove an over match
for all other branches of the Government.
I will not acquiese in the reversal of all just ideas of Government. I will
not degrade the character ef popular representation. I will not blindly confide "'here all experienr.e admonishes to be jealous. I will not trust Executivt
power, vested in a single 11iagistrate, t-0 keep the vigils of li berty.
Encroachment must be resisted at every step. Whether the consequences
be prejudicial or not, if there be an illegal exercise of power it must be resisted
in the proper manner. We are not to wait till great mischief come-till the
Government is overthrown, or liberty itself put in extreme jeopardy. We
should not be worthy sons of our fathers were we so to regard questions affecting freedom. 'l'hey accomplished the Revolution on a strict question of principle. They took up arms against the preamble of an act. They saw in the
claim of the British Parliament a seminal principle of mischief, the germ of
unjust power, which they struck at till they destroyed it. On this question of
prmciple, while actual suffering was yet afar off, they raised their fiag against
a power to which Rome in her glory is not to be compared-a power which
has dotted the surface of the whole earth with her military posts, whose
morning drum-beat, following the sun and keeping compa.ny with the hours,
circles the earth daily with one continuous, unbroken strain of the martial
airs of England,
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C.
In 1813, a citizen being held in cUBtody by Major-General Lewis, command-

ing a division of the United States army, on a charge of treason, a writ of
habeas corpus was issued by the Supreme Court of New York, to which General Lewis, having made an evasive return, an attachment was awarded
against him, accompanied by the following opinion of the whole Court, delivered by Kent, Chief Justice. (See 10, Johnson, 333.)
"This is a case which concerns the personal liberty of the citizen. Stacy
is now suffering the rigor of confinement, in close custody. He is a natural
born citizen, residing in this State. The pretended charge of treason, without
being founded on oath, and without any specification of the matters of which
it might consist, and without any color of authority in any military tribunal
to try a citizen for that crime, is only aggravation of the oppression of the
confinement. It is the indispensable duty of this Court, and one to which
every inferior consideration must be sacrificed, to act a faithful guardian of
the liberty of the citizens, and to give ready and effectual aid to the means
provided by Jaw for its security. One of the most valuable of those means is
this writ of habeas corpus, which has been justly deemed the glory of the
English law; and the Parliament of England, as well as its Courts of Justice,
have, on several occasions, and for centuries, shown the utmost solicitude, not
only that the writ, when called for, should be issued without delay, but that
it should be punctually obeyed. Nor can we hesitate in enforcing a due return to the writ when we recollect that, in this country, the law knows no
superior; and that, in England, her courts have taught us, by a series of instructions and examples, to exact the strictest obedience to whatever extent
the persons to whom the writ is directed may be clothed with power, or exalted
in rank.
·
"If ever a case called for the most prompt interposition of the Court to enforce obedience to its process, this is one. A military commander is here assuming criminal jurisdiction over a private citizen, is holding him .in close
confinement and contemning the cillil authori ty of the State."

D.
SYNOP818 OF OASES REFERRED TO BY ATTORNEY-GENERAL.

'l'he first cited is the Rhode Island case 7, Howard, involving the validiby of
a statute declaring martial Jaw over that State, which had been sustained by
its highest court. The points decided by the Supreme Court areFirst. That according to uniform precedent usage, the Court must conform
to the decision of the State Court, this being a matter of purely local State
law.
Second. That whenever it may become necessary for the Federal Government to det-ermine which of two conflicting governments in a State is the
rightful one, it is for Congress and the Executive,. who represent the political
power, and not for the Judiciary to decide.
When these points were decided the whole case was disposed of; and all else
in the loose opinion delivered was extra-judicial, and the obiter dicta of the
judge delivering the opinion.
In reply to a question, having no pertinency to the case in hand, that a
government by martial law is not such a. Republican government as is granted
by the Federal Constitution, th& opinion wanders off into loose talk a.bout
that. Whilst conceding that permanent martial law would not be a Republica.n government, yet, it says, the legisla.ture of a State, having the rl~ht to use
it.a whole military power in suppressing rebellion, and, treating martial law as
part of that power, says it may be temporarily used for that purpose. But
this must be taken in connection with the fact stated by the Court, that the
people of Rhode Island were then still Jiving under their old Colonial charter
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as their form of government-they being, consequently, without the protection of a written constitution or bill of rights, the Federo.l Constitution having no bearing on their case. Not a word is said going to show that tho President, or Congress, or any other State legislature, having a bill of rights,
could establisf martial law; nor is there the slightest intimation that the President can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corp1is.
·
It is evident, also, that in speaking of martial law, the writer of the opinion had in contemplation a very different sort of power from what has heretofore been uniformly understood by law, and political writers, and in common parlance, as to the meaning of the phrase " martial law." He seems to treat it as
a sort of mere adjunct to ministerial power in the enforcement of existing la,v,
and by no means as the introducing of a new or the suspending of the old
law.
.
Justice to Chief Justice Taney requires that these extra-judicial-sayings of
his, in this case, should bo taken in connection with his recent decision in the
Merriman caae, the latter, by all comity of the profession, being entitled to be
treated as the more deliberate, and therefore the better expression of his opinion. 'l'his latter opinion is so clear, orthodox, and unanswerable in the expression of his views as to fundamental principles of the Constitution in direct, plain, indisputable conflict with the exercise of any such power by Congress, or the President, for establishing martial law, that it must, with every
fair, intelligent mind, exempt him from the dishonoring imputation of having
meant, by the former opinion, to have made any such concession. At any
rate, the candid will all agree, that the 1:ttter strips the former of all pret~nsion
as a judicial authority for the purpose claimed. Besides, the former opinion
expressly says that. the Petition of Right abolished martial law in England,
except as to the omnipotent power of Parliament, consequently the equivalent
expressions in our bill of rights must have abolished it in this country also,
without any exception of Congress or President, there being no omnipotent
power here.
The next case cited by the Attorney-General is Flemming vs. Howard-9,,
Howard, 603-which merely decides, that though Tampico was occupied by
United States forces during the Mexicnn wa.r , it was still a foreign port, i.ud
duties could properly be levied on goods imported from that place.
'l'he next case cited is Cross vs. Hnrrison-16, Howard, 164. It only decides that tonnage on foreign vessels, and duties on foreign goods, imported
into San Francisco, were la wfully collected by the temporary government
whilst the war with Mexico continued; and afterwards, until the revenue system of the United States was put into operation there by Congress; also, that
the formation of a temporary p:overnment in California, by our General, was
the legitimate exercise of a belligerent right over a conquered territory of the
forei~n enemy.
The next case is the Santisimo 'frinidadla-7, Wheaton, 305. The principal points decided here were, that the commission of a public ship of a foreign State, signed hy the proper nuthorit.ies, is conclusive evidence of her
national character; and that during the existence of civil war between Spain
and her colonies, and previous to our acknowledgment of their independence,
the colonies were deemed by us belligerent nations, entitled, so far as concerned us, to all sovereign rights of war against their enemy. There were
various other points disposed of, but none having any nearer analogy than
these, to the President's power over the writ of habeas corpus.
The only other case eited is Martin vs. Wheaton-12, Wheaton, 29. The
only matter decided in this case, having the slightest bearing upon the
claimed power of the President over the writ of habeas corpus, is this; That
the authority to decide whether there is a danger of invasion to justify a call
of militia to repel it, under the act of Congress, is exclusively vested in the
President, and his decision thereon is conclusive. This is plain, good authority to prove, what needed no proof, his like authority to determine the
question of an existing rebe\lion, under the same act, authorizing a similar call
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for its suppression; but it does not tend at all to prove his power to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus ns on aid i11 supprn~sing the rebellion.
•r~se arc the cnses, 11ll the authorities relied on, for justifying so extraor•
dinary, so unprecedented a usurpation of power. They, none of them, nor all
of them together, give it the sli;dlte~t ~anction. . The pretense, that they do,
falls within the category of the broadly ludicrous. There never was used, on
any important occasion, the parade of' " such a bel(garly account of empty
boxes to make up a show," and guIJ ignorant credulity.

E.
SECTIONS OF THE BILL llEFORE THE SENATE, NOT PASSED FOR WANT OF TBIE,

"Sec. 2. After publication of said proolnmation (of rebellion) the said com·
mander shall make nnd pub)iijh such police i·ules and regulations, conforming as nearly as may be to previously existing laws, as he may deem necessw·y
to suppress said rebellion, restore. order, and to protect the lives and property
of all the loyal citizens within said district; and all the ci'fJil authorities within
said district sha.ll be bound to carry said rules and regulations into effect.
"Sec. 3. If, from nny cause whatever, the said civil authorities fail to execute said rules and regulations, the said military commander shall cause them
to be executed and enforced by the military force under his command."
Here it is distinctly attempted to give power to a mil itary commander to
legislate at will, or make la,ws for a. whole State, and which even the civil authorities are enjoined to obey- stringent laws, too, sucli ns are necessary to
suppress rebellion. The simulated restriction of'' as near as 1nay be to previously existing laws" is no restriction at all, nor was it meant to be. As tiea.r
ns may be, would be the identical same laws, which would not do; for new
Jaws are intended, and, wbntever may be the meaning of police regulations
for a. whole State, if they be of State creation, they are necP.ssa.rily limited,
and under judicial control, whereas the intent of the bill is to place the com·
man<ler's stringent rules and regulations above that control. Besides, they are
such "as he may deem necessary to suppress rebeIJion," &c., and if those pre•
existinu are not adequate or proper, he, of course, is to make others to suit
himself. So that they are such "ns he deems necc~s,iry," that is all which is
requisite to their valid it ;. This is a delegation or substitution of Jegisltitive
power with n vengeance. The attempt is ernn without a mask-it is impudently made, without an effort at disj!uise. Herc, it is also noticeable, is o.
distinct recognition of a civil authority in the h\nd, of which the President
and his military subordinates form no part, notwithstanding the theory of
Messrs. Lincoln and Bates.
·
"Sec. 4. From and after the publication of the proclamation, the operation
of the writ of habeas corptis shalJ be so far suspended that no military officer
shnll be compelled to return the body of ,iny person or persons detained by
him by military authority; but, upon the certiticnte, under oath, by the officer
having charge of any one so detained, that such person is detained by him as
a pri$oner under military authority, furtbe1· proceedings under the writ shall
be dismissed by the judge, or coul't, luwing issued so.id writ."
This section is a sad specimen of senato1ria.l professional ability, supposing,
iu charity to the Henate, that it did not intend to make every petty officer a
sort of sub•dictator in his sphere. Jlh·ery captain, lieutenant, sergeant, and
corporal is not only an officer, but also "a military authority," and any of
them having a citizen in custody, under his own causeless, un,,ut.horized arrest, may truthfully return tbiit the prisoner is held by militnry authority.
'rhe court must take his say-so in the matter, dismiss the writ, and is not permitted to inquire whether, in fact, the detention is by real military authority
that is in conformity with those same rules and regulations, or upon the mere
authority of Mister Corporal. Indeed, the section allows the rules and regulations to go even to that extent, and permit a.n ,imprisonment by a corporal,
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upon his own discretion, without any limit to the durat.ion of the imprieon•
ment or the diecretion. This is splendid le!j:islation for Senators of a free
people. They must be possessed with somethrng worse than what Mr. Dana
desi~nates as "pusillanimity."
"l:iec. 5. AU persons, who, after the poblication of said proclamation, shall
be found in arms against the United States, or otherwise aiding or abetting
their enem iea or opposei·s, within any district t-0 which it relates, and shall be
taken by tbe forces of tho United States, shall be either detained as pri8oners
for trial on the charge of treason or sedition, or other crimes or o;tfemes,
which they may have committed whilst resisting the authority of the lJnited
States, or may, according to the circnmst.ances of the case, be at once placed
before a court martial to be dealt with according to the rules of war in re•
spect to unorganized and lawless anned bands not recognized as regular troops,
or may be discharged on parole not to serve against the United States, nor to
aid or abet their enemies or opposers."
·
What an enemy is we all know; the books have taught us that; but who
knows what is an "opposer 7" Does it mean one actin~ in political opposi•
tion to the ruling power in the governmen t-the Republican party? It may
well mean that, and full as appropriately as a.nythin~ el~e. Does not the very
introduction of such a new word, in connection with the crime of treason,
sufficiently indicate some sinister purpose 7 ',V'hy should such an unusual,
undefined, undefinable word be used, but in the hope that the military satraps
would give to it tho very construction indicated? In the estimation of the
getters-up of this bill, there is probably not many things better deserving pun•
isbment than opposition to their party rule. In debate they glorified their
magnanimity for permitting freedom of debate in the Senate, and allowing
Senators to censure their proceedings. What a contrast to the English House
of Lords and House of Commons, permitting, withont any st1ch self•glori6cation,
Chatham, Fox, Burke, and others, freely to denounce the war against our rebellious fathers, and openly pray for the defeat of the British armies.
"Resisting the authority of the United States." What does that mean? Ir
a citizen should say of this bill, after it hM passed, that it is unconstitutional,
would that be resisting ?-would that be "sedition 7"
"Unorganized, lawle~s armed bands." What does that mean? where shall
we find the signification of those phrases? Ar e not all armed r ebels " lawless
bands?" So they have always been understood to be. If they are not meant,
then what is meant by "lawless bands." Here, again, the selection of loose
phraseology enhances the suspicion of a sinister purpose.
"Dealt with" is well enough in common parlance or ordinary composition,
and, in the connection here used, would have a well understood and most ter,
rible significance, but is wholly inappropriate in a legal enactment ordering
capital punishment. It is usual and decent for such Jaws to say whether it
shall be by stranl(lllation, beheading, or shooting, and not leave that delicate
matter to Jack Ketch, even though he may wear an epaulet, or even two
epaulets.
"Sec. 6. N o sentence of death pronounced by a. court martial upon any per•
son ta ken in arms as aforesaid, shall be executed before it bas been submitted
to the commander of the milit.·uy department within which the conviction bai,
taken place, or to the Commanding General of the Army of the United States,
who shall either approve the judgment of the court martial, commµte the sen•
tence, or may discharge or pardon the p~soo so sentenced."
.
- The whole pardoning power is conferred by the Constitution upon the Pre11ident, and it would seem that no cnpital punishment should ever be inflicted
without bis having a reasonable opportunity to int~rpose with the nation's
mercy. So the matter has always been treated by our court!!. It is a pvwer
which the President himself can neither abdicate or deputize; yet these
b lunderers are trying to take it away, and give it to our Generals. If they
exercise it accordmg to the usage of other satraps, it will prove to them ll
most lucrative power.
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This bill takes no sort of care as to the composition of the courts martial.

It would seem but relll!onable that a. citizen, when tried for his life, should

have the privileire of a court composed of officers from his own State, if to be
conveniently had, that the trial should be had in the district where the offense
was committed, that it should be public, and that he should have compulsory
process for his witnesses. But, above all, a.n American cit.izen should have
the privilege of being tried by his countrymen, and not bv foreigners. None
of these essentials are attended to. A citizen can be ')rdered to death by a.
court composed entirely of foreigners. Indeed, they are the. description of
officers most apt to be selected by a vindictive, tyrannical commander, for
they have already shown their alacrity in dealing ,vith opposers of the goveroment in o. manner entirely to suit the taste of such a commander, and the
probable taste of the contrivers of this 'infamous bill of infamies.
It would be some consolation to thi, bereaved family and sorrmvin~ friends
of a victim of martial law. to know that he had some show of fa.ir trial before
& court of his countrymen,. instead of a packed court of Germans. It would also
be right, when the accused is a. foreigner, that he should have the privilege of
a court de midiatate linquCll.

